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I. Introduction
Janis Erichsen went shopping at her neighborhood No-Frills grocery store
in Omaha at 6:00 a.m. on a Sunday in July.' She locked her car before enter-
ing the store.2 When Ms. Erichsen returned, she put her groceries in the car,
locked it again, and then took her shopping cart back to the store.' Returning
from the store and otherwise alone in the parking lot, she noticed a man
walking straight toward her Uncomfortable with his approach, she hurried
to unlock her car door.'
Before she could get in her car, the man sprayed her in the face with
mace, took her purse, and walked backto an automobile atthe edge of the lot.6
He entered the car and placed Erichsen's purse between the two front seats.
Erichsen pursued the man to his car and reached in it to reclaim her purse.'
He sprayed her with mace a second time, and then he put the car in gear and
drove away? Erichsen became entangled in the car's seatbelt strap, and her
assailant dragged her for 1.6 miles." She lost both kneecaps and underwent
at least a dozen surgeries."
Nicholas DiVincenzo, a real estate broker, rented an office in a seven-
story building at a south Florida office complex." The office building was in
an area in which the crime rate was "unusually high."13 Also, the building
management neither locked the doors of the building nor activated the security
camera until 7:00 p.m. 4 One day, sometime after 6:00 p.m., DiVincenzo left
his office unlocked and unattended and went across the hall to the bathroom. 5
1. See Erichsen v. No-Frills Supermarkets, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 116, 118 (Neb. 1994)
(describing facts of attack); State v. Bennett, 508 N.W.2d 294, 296 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993)
(describing facts of case in resulting criminal trial).









11. Id. Erichsen eventually tried her case to a jury, and the jury returned a defense
verdict. Telephone Interview with Brian Welch, attorney for No-Frills Supermarkets, Cassem,
Tiemey, Adams, Gotsch & Douglas, Omaha (Feb. 9,1999).
12. See Green Cos. v. DiVincenzo, 432 So. 2d 86,87 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1983) (describ-
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When DiVincenzo returned to his office, an assailant attacked him, and he
suffered substantial permanent injuries.16
Both of the individuals described in these accounts suffered terribly. Yet,
juries found both at least partially responsible for their injuries in suits against
the business owners of the property on which the criminal attacks occurred.
The plaintiffs based their suits on a cause of action generally referred to as
"premises security" or "negligent security."" Negligent security actions based
on attacks such as those described above became more numerous during the
1970s.18 Although common carriers and innkeepers have long had a duty to
protect passengers and guests from the intentional misconduct of others, in the
1970s states began to impose such a duty on possessors of other kinds of real
property.19 Now, plaintiffs bring such suits against apartment complexes,
20
shopping malls,2 ' hospitals,l grocery stores,' schools, 24 and other busi-
nesses.' Indeed, with one authority reporting that the average jury award in
a negligent security action involving a wrongful death is $2.1 million,26 it is
16. Id. The jury found DiVincenzo's own negligence contributed twenty-five percent to
his injuries. Id.
17. SeeALANKAMi~sKYACo LeTGUETOPREMsSEc TRnYIfGA' ON3 (1995)
(using term "premises security"); JosEPHA. PAGE, TH LAwoFPRmESLIAB]iTY § 11.3,at293
(2d ed. 1988) (using term "negligent-security"). The commentators use the terms interchange-
ably, but for the sake of clarity, this Note will use the term "negligent security" throughout.
18. See RicARD S. KumAN, SAFEPLAcEs? SEcURirYPLANNINGANDLTIGATION § 1-
1, at 2 (1989) (describing expansion of tort liability for negligent security as result of increase
in and frustration with crime).
19. See PAGE, supra note 17, § 11.3, at 291-92 (noting negligent security doctrine devel-
oped during 1970s and 1980s and describing current doctrine in states as inconsistent); see also
Mark P. Buell, Liabilityfor Inadequate Security, 69 R. B.J. 58, 58 (1995) (identifying 1975
rape of singer Connie Francis at hotel, with $2.5 million verdict, as "mother if not grandmother"
of all premises security cases); Robert J. Homant & Daniel B. Kennedy, LandholderResponsi-
bilityfor ThirdParty Crimes in Michigan: AnAnaysis of UnderlyingLegal Values, 27 U. TOL.
L. REV. 115, 115 (1995) (identifying 1970 action against residential landlord as first successful
example of negligent security action).
20. See Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 478-80 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (describing criminal assault on tenant in common hallway of apartment building).
21. See Seibert v. Vie Regnier Builders, Inc., 856 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Kan. 1993) (describ-
ing shooting in shopping center's subterranean parking garage).
22. See Isaacs v. Huntington Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 695 P.2d 653,662 (Cal. 1985) (describ-
ing shooting in hospital parking lot).
23. See Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 694 A.2d 1017, 1019 (N.J. 1997)
(describing abduction from parking lot and subsequent murder of supermarket customer).
24. See Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 449 N.E.2d 331,333-34 (Mass. 1983) (describing
rape in college dormitory room).
25. See Hardee v. Cunningham & Smith, Inc., 679 So. 2d 1316,1317 (Fla. Dist. Ct App.
1996) (describing stabbing, beating, and robbery of self-service cat wash patron).
26. KAMINSKY, supra note 17, at4.
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little wonder that such actions are becoming more common across the coun-
try. The same authority reports that the average jury award in negligent
security actions involving rape is $1.8 million.' With more than 4000 rapes
reported in American parking lots and garages in 1995,2 it is clear that this
theory of recovery exposes business possessors and their insurers to stagger-
ing liability.
To recover in a negligent security action, a plaintiff must show that the
possessor of the property on which the criminal attack occurred owed a duty
of care for the plaintiff's safety, that the possessor breached that duty, and that
the breach was the proximate cause of the injuries criminally inflicted on the
plaintiff.' In such actions, one can assign responsibility to any of three
actors: the business owner or landlord (possessor), the criminal (intentional
tortfeasor), or the victim (plaintiff). Thus, negligent security cases present
unusual doctrinal problems. A plaintiff alleges that a possessor is at fault for
failing to take sufficient precautions to prevent foreseeable criminal attacks;
yet the occurrence of crime is notoriously difficult to predict and prevent. The
intentional tortfeasor's fault is obvious. However, because most states pro-
hibit the comparison of negligent and intentional fault, the possessor generally
cannot join the intentional tortfeasor in order to reduce the possessor's expo-
sure to liability. Finally, there is the fault of the plaintiff. In the criminal law,
of course, any fault on the part of the victim is generally irrelevant to convic-
tion and punishment of the wrongdoer." However, because the plaintiff in a
negligent security action alleges that the possessor was negligent, no doctrinal
bar exists to prevent the possessor from employing the defense of contributory
or comparative negligence, requiring a jury to evaluate the reasonableness of
the plaintiff's conduct with respect to the attack.
In considering the possessors' duty to protect patrons from the criminal
actions ofthird parties, commentators have focused primarily on the tests used
to determine the foreseeability of criminal attacks. 1 Commentators have also
considered whether courts should allow juries to compare the fault of the
intentional tortfeasor with that of the negligent tortfeasor when assessing the
27. Id.
28. STATISTIcALABSTRAcT OF TfE UNITED STATES, nos. 320 & 326 (117th ed. 1997).
29. See KAMINSKY, supra note 17, at 7 (describing elements of negligent security action).
30. However, one recent commentator called for the adoption of comparative fault in
criminal law. See Alon Harl, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a
CriminalLawPrinciple ofComparativeFault, 82 CAL. L. Rrv. 1181,1181 (1994) (arguing that
application of comparative fault principle in criminal law, by providing that criminals who acted
against careless victims would be exculpated or have their sentences reduced, would promote
efficiency and fairness).
31. See generally KUHLMAN, supra note 18, § 2-2(B); PAGE, supra note 17, § 11.17;
JoHN/A TARANTINO & MARKA. DOMBROFF, PREMIS SECURITY: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.A
(1990).
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fault of the possessor. 2 However, no published source formally addresses the
doctrinal grounding for determinations of whether a plaintiff in a negligent
security action might be partially responsible for suffering the attack. This
Note undertakes such an examination. It analyzes the possible fault of the
plaintiff in a negligent security action in relation to the fault of the possessor
and the intentional tortfeasor. This Note concludes that individuals owe a
duty to themselves to anticipate and to take precautions against foreseeable
criminal attack, and the Note provides a framework to guide assessments of
plaintiffs' fault in negligent security actions.
Because any fault on the part of the plaintiff commonly occurs jointly
with the fault of the possessor and the fault of the intentional tortfeasor, this
Note first examines doctrine governing the fault of these other two actors.
Accordingly, Part I of this Note traces the rise of negligent security actions
and the development of the various tests to determine the foreseeability of
criminal acts by third persons for which plaintiffs can hold a possessor
liable.33 Part I then discusses the comparison of the fault of intentional
tortfeasors in negligent security actions and concludes that states should allow
the comparison. 4 Part IV examines case law relevant to the issue of the
plaintiff's fault and asks whether plaintiffs have a duty to avoid suffering an
intentional tort. Part IV proposes the adoption of traditional tort doctrine for
determining and comparing a plaintiff's fault in negligent security actions.3
Part V calls for states to impose on individuals a duty to anticipate and avoid
crime. 6 This Note also proposes a model jury instruction to assist juries in
32. See generallv Jake Dear & Steven E. Zipperstein, Comparative Fault and Intentional
Torts: Doctrinal Barriers and Policy Considerations, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1984)
(advocating reforms allowing comparison of intentional and negligent fault in certain cases);
Gail D. Hollister, Using Comparative Fault to Replace theAll-or-Nothing Lottery Imposed in
Intentional Torts Suits in Which Both Plaintiff and DefendantAre at Fault, 46 VAND. L. REV.
121 (1993) (same); Theresa L. Fiset, Note, Comparative Fault as a Tool to Nullify the Duty to
Protect: ApportioningLiability to a Non-Party Intentional Torifeasor in Stellas v. Alamo Rent-
A-Car, Inc., 27 STETSON L. REv. 699 (1997) (rejecting arguments calling for comparison of
negligent and intentional fault).
33. See infra Part Hf (describing tests used to determine foreseeability of crime to posses-
sors).
34. See infra Part ml (discussing comparison of negligent and intentional fault in negli-
gent security actions).
35. See infra Part IV (examining doctrine governing determinations of plaintiff's fault).
When addressing apportionment of liability, the forthcoming Restatement of Torts: Apportion-
ment ofLiability adopts the term "comparative responsibility" instead of "comparative fault" or
"comparative causation." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILTY § 1 cmt a
(Proposed Final Draft (Revised) (March 22, 1999)). This Note maintains use of the more
traditional "fault" throughout
36. See infra Part V (concluding that states should impose on individuals duty to antici-
pate and avoid crime).
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properly comparing the fault of the plaintiff with that of the intentional
tortfeasor and the possessor in negligent security actions.
I. The Defendant's Duty in Negligent Security Actions
The common law imposed no duty on a private party to protect others
from criminal acts of unknown third persons.' Exceptions to that rule have
long existed, and they developed with the recognition of special relation-
ships,3" such as those between common carrier and passenger9 and between
innkeeper and guest.4" In 1965, section 344 of the Restatement (Second) of
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965) (asserting that generally there
is no duty to control conduct of third person to prevent that person from causing harm to
another); see also WIIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THELAw OF TORTS § 33, at 173-74 (4th
ed. 1971) (stating that generally one does not owe duty to protect others from criminal acts of
third persons). Explanations for longstanding refusal to impose such a duty have varied. Some
of the reasons for not imposing such a duty likely stem from the distinction between misfea-
sance and nonfeasance: "The highly individualistic philosophy of the older common law had
no great difficulty in working out restraints upon the commission of affirmative acts of harm,
but shrank from converting the courts into an agency for forcing men to help one another." Id.
§ 56, at 339. Commentators have also suggested that courts have refused to impose a duty to
protect others from criminal acts because of th6 following factors: "the criminal act is an inter-
vening cause of harm, the difficulty in foreseeing criminal acts, the vagueness of the standard
of care required to meet that duty, the economic consequences, and the fear of conflicting with
the policy that the protection of citizens is the duty of the government." Michael J. Yelnosky,
Comment, Business Inviters'Duty to Protect Invitees from CriminalActs, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
883, 889 (1986); see McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. Partnership, 937 S.W.2d 891, 897-98
(Tenn. 1996) (discussing various justifications for not imposing duty on business to prevent
criminal attacks on their patrons).
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965) ("There is no duty to control
the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless...
a special relationship exists....").
39. See, e.g., Isenberg v. New York, N.H. &H.R. Co., 108 N.E. 1046,1047 (Mass. 1915)
(finding carrier breached duty by failing to prevent battery of one passenger by another
passenger when its servants knew trouble was brewing); McWilliams v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry.
Co., 109 N.W. 272,274 (MIich. 1906) (affirming verdict for plaintiffwho suffered powder bums
to her face as result of drunken man firing blank cartridges from pistol); Twichell v. Pecos &
N.T. Ry. Co., 131 S.W. 243,245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910) (finding railroad's negligence to be jury
question 'when its servants had notice both of prior trouble between two passengers and
viciousness of passenger who battered another passenger); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 314A (1965) ("A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reason-
able action.., to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm....").
40. See, e.g., McFadden v. Bancroft Hotel Corp., 46 N.E.2d 573, 576 (Mass. 1943)
(affirming verdict against hotel after third party struck patron in restaurant); Curran v. Olson,
92 N.W. 1124, 1125 (Minn. 1903) (affirming innkeeper liable when third party poured alcohol
on sleeping plaintiff's foot and then set it afire); Rommel v. Schambacher, 11 A 779, 779 (Pa.
1887) (affirming innkeeper liability when drunken guest pinned piece of paper to drunken plain-
tiff's back and set it and plaintiff afire); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A
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Torts (the Restatement) recognized a general duty owed by business possess-
ors to provide their guests reasonable protection from foreseeable criminal
assaults.4 ' Thus, the recent increase in the number of negligent security
actions is not the result of a radical new cause of action but rather the expan-
sion of a pre-existing action during a time of high crime rates.
Subsequent to the publication of the Restatement with its expanded duty
for business possessors, the states have struggled both with whether to impose
this duty and with its proper scope.42 An abundance of scholarly writings mark
(1965) (stating that innkeeper is under duty to take reasonable action to protect guests); PAGE,
supra note 17, § 11.2, at 292 n.2 (identifying relationships between school and pupil, jailer and
prisoner, and hospital and patient as also giving rise to duty to provide protection).
41. RESTAIEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965) (imposing on business possessors
duty to protect guests from harmful acts of third persons). The section provides as follows:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business
purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the
land for such a purpose, for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or
intentionally harmful acts of third persons or animals, and by failure of the pos-
sessor to exercise reasonable care to (a) discover that such acts are being done or
are likely to be done, or (b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid
the harm, or otherwise to protect them against it
Id. Furthermore, comment (f) to section 344 speaks directly to the business possessor's duty
to police the premises:
Since the possessor is not the insurer of the visitor's safety, he is ordinarily under
no duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason to know that the acts of
the third person are occurring, or are about to occur. He may, however, know or
have reason to know, from past experience, that there is a likelihood of conduct on
the part of third persons in general which is likely to endanger the safety of the
visitor, even though he has no reason to expect it on the part of any particular
individual. If the place or the character of his business, or his past experience, is
such that he should reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part
of third persons, either generally or at some particular time, he may be under a duty
to take precautions against it, and to provide a reasonably sufficient number of
servants to afford a reasonable protection.
Id. § 344 cmt. f.
42. Academic writing traces the increasing frequency of negligent security litigation inthe 1980s and 1990s. See general Michael J. Bazyler, TheDut toProvideAdequateProtec-
lion: Landowners'Liability for Failure to ProtectPatronsfirom CriminalAttack, 21 ARIZ. L.
REv. 727 (1979) (discussing duty of possessor to protect entrants from third party criminal
attacks); Homant & Kennedy, supra note 19 (same); Martin J. Rooney, Liabiliy of a Premises
Owner for the Provision of Security: The Massachusetts Experience, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
51 (1995) (same); Virginia M. Chock & Leslie H. Kondo, Note, Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway
Hotel, Inc.: Imposing a Duty to Protect Against Third Party Criminal Conduct on the Pre-
mises, 11 U. HAW. L. REV. 231 (1989) (same); Suzanne Ciaccio, Comment, Business Owners'
Duty to Protect Patronsfrom the Criminal Acts of Third Parties in Louisiana, 53 LA. L. REV.
1847 (1993) (same); Wdliam Joseph Flannagan, Comment, Negligent Security: Is Peter Pan
a Merchant's Nightmare? Sharpe v. Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc., 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1193
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the path of the doctrine as it has progressed through the state courts." All
states have now recognized-that business possessors owe, under circumstances
that vary from state to state, a duty to protect their customers from the criminal
acts of third parties."' However, recent case law demonstrates that the scope
of the duty and the proper test for measuring it are not settled issues.4" In
general, states have used four different tests to establish foreseeability in
negligent security actions: the imminent harm test, the prior criminal inci-
dents test, the totality ofthe circumstances test, and the balancing test.
A. The Imminent Harm Test
A number of jurisdictions have limited the duty of business possessors
to instances in which the storeowner knows or has reason to know that crimes
against customers are taking place or are about to take place.46 In these
jurisdictions, upon discovering a customer in peril, possessors can meet their
(1990) (same); Heidi A. Guttau-Fox, Case Note, No Foreseeability, No Duty, No-Frillsl The
Nebraska Supreme Court Imposes a Duty in Erichsen v. No-Frills Supermarkets, Inc., 29
CREIGHToN L. REV. 439 (1995) (same); David A. Roodman, Note, Business Owners Duty to
Protect Invitees from ThirdParty Criminal Attacks - or - "Business Owners Beware: Missouri
Ups the Ante," 54 Mo. L. REV. 443 (1989) (same); Donna Lee Welch, Comment, Ann M. v.
Pacific Plaza Shopping Center: The California Supreme Court Retreats from Its Totality of the
CircumstancesApproach to Premises Liability, 28 GA. L. REV. 1053 (1994) (same).
43. See supra note 42 (providing sources citing examples of analyses of duty to protect
others from criminal acts of third parties).
44. See KAMINSKY, supra note 17,at 109-78 (providing state-by-state summary of leading
negligent security cases and noting very limited duty in Alabama and Michigan); PAGE, supra
note 17, § 11.3, at 293 (noting support for broad no-duty rule is "virtually non-existent").
45. See, e.g., Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 694 A.2d 1017, 1027-28 (N.J.
1997) (adopting totality of circumstances test and finding supermarket had duty to provide
parking lot security); McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. Partnership, 937 S.W.2d 891, 902 (Tenn.
1996) (adopting "balancing test" and rejecting limited rule enunciated in Cornpropst v. Sloan,
528 S.W.2d 188,198 (Tenn. 1975)); Nivens v. 7-11 Hoagy's Comer, 943 P.2d 286, 294 (Wash.
1997) (recognizing special relationship between store and customer imposed duty on store to
take reasonable steps to protect customer but finding store had no separate duty to provide on-
premises security guards).
46. See, e.g., Henley v. Pizitz Realty Corp., 456 So. 2d 272, 277 (Ala. 1984) (finding
plaintiff's abduction from parking garage and subsequent rape was not result of defendant's
negligent failure to provide security, despite prior instances of serious crime on premises,
because no evidence suggested defendant knew or had reason to know of imminent bodily harm
to plaintiff); Shipes v. Piggly Wiggly St. Andrews, Inc., 238 S.E.2d 167, 169 (S.C. 1977)
(finding defendant store not liable for assault on plaintiff in parking lot because employees had
no knowledge attack was occurring or was about to occur); Bums v. Johnson, 458 S.E.2d 448,
450 (Va. 1995) (ruling gas station not liable for abduction and rape of customer, who left car
at pump for more than one hour just after drunk male customer tried to gain entry to locked
store by uttering lewd suggestion to female attendant, because evidence "utterly" failed to show
attendant knew criminal assault was about to occur).
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duty by warning the customer or by summoning the police.47 This approach
to defining the duty of a storeowner is advocated by section 344 of the Re-
statement, but few jurisdictions retain it as the sole means of establishing a
business owner's liability.4"
B. The Prior Similar Incidents Test
Under the prior similar incidents test, third party crimes against custom-
ers are foreseeable only if the plaintiff can establish that the defendant knew
or should have known of prior similar crimes on the premises.49 Commenta-
tors and courts have criticized the prior similar incidents test because it gives
the possessor at least one "free" injury. 0 Commentators also have criticized
the test for removing too many cases from the jury and for generating arbitrary
decisions about what kinds of prior crimes are sufficiently similar to establish
foreseeability.51
C. The Totality of the Circumstances Test
At least in part as a reaction to the shortcomings of the prior similar
incidents rule, several states have adopted a totality of the circumstances test
for determining when a factfinder can deem criminal acts of third parties
47. PAGE, supra note 17, §11.3, at 294 (noting variations on Restatement approach); see
Ballew v. Southland Corp., 482 So. 2d 890, 894 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (finding possessor liable
for employee's failure to timely notify police when employee knew or should have known of
potential danger to customer).
48. See PAGE, supra note 17, §11.3, at 294; see also McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. Part-
nership, 937 S.W.2d 891,902 (Tenn. 1996) (adopting "balancing test" and rejecting knowledge
ofimminent crime rule enunciated in Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.d 188,198 (Tenn. 1975)).
But see Taylor v. Hynson, 856 P.2d 278, 281 (Okla. 1993) (finding exception to broad no-duty
rule exists, stating "[w]hen invitor has knowledge that an invitee is in imminent danger, the
invitor must act reasonably to prevent injury").
49. See, e.g., Mills v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 482 S.E.2d 449,450 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (con-
struing prior similar incidents rule narrowly by affirming no liability when shopper injured by
fleeing shoplifter because plaintiff failed to present any evidence of prior incidents in which
patron was injured by fleeing thief); Brown v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., 973 S.W.2d 530, 533
(Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (finding for defendant store because plaintiff failed to produce evidence
of prior similar incidents of violent crimes on premises that were "sufficiently numerous and
recent to put a defendant on notice" that parking lot assault was foreseeable); Lauersdorf v.
Supermarket Gen. Corp., 657 N.Y.S.2d 732, 733 (App. Div. 1997) (finding property crimes
gave no notice that rape of plaintiff was foreseeable).
50. See PAGE, supra note 17, § 11.6, at 298-99 (citing Isaacs v. Huntington Mem'l Hosp.,
Inc., 695 P.2d 653, 665 (Cal. 1985) and discussing limitations of"prior similars" rule).
51. See id. (citing criticisms of test); see also McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. Partnership,
937 S.W.2d 891, 900 (Tenn. 1996) (criticizing rule because it improperly removes too many
cases from jury).
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sufficiently foreseeable to impose liability on possessors5 2 This test, most
notably articulated in the California case Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial
Hospital Inc.," greatly expands the scope of a possessor's duty. 4 Under the
totality of the circumstances test, a plaintiff may introduce evidence of
foreseeability that would generally not be admissible in a jurisdiction using
a prior similar incidents rule. Such evidence can include the architectural
design of the possessor's premises; 5 any security measures the possessor has
52. See, e.g., Seibert v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc., 856 P.2d 1332, 1334, 1339 (Kan.
1993) (adopting totality of circumstances approach when plaintiff shot in underground parking
garage and no evidence was offered of prior similar crimes in parking garage); Clohesy v. Food
Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 694 A.2d 1017, 1027 (N.J. 1997) (rejecting prior similar incidents
rule in favor of totality of circumstances rule in case involving abduction from parking lot and
subsequent murder); Reitz v. May Co. Dept. Stores, 583 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (Ohio Ct. App.
1990) (adopting totality of circumstances test that allowed consideration of evidence of prior
nonviolent crimes when plaintiff was stabbed and automobile stolen in parking lot); see also
Torres v. United States Nat'l Bank, 670 P.2d 230, 235-36 (Or. App. 1983) (describing totality
of circumstances test without naming it as such in case where plaintiff was shot and robbed at
bank's night depository).
53. 695 P.2d 653 (1985).
54. Isaacs v. Huntington Mem'l Hosp. Inc., 695 P.2d 653, 665 (Cal. 1985) (stating
factfinder should not determine foreseeability by "rigid application of 'prior similars' rule"
and instead should determine foreseeabiity "in light of all the circumstances"). In Isaacs,
the court considered whether evidence other than the prior similar incidents on its premises
could establish the foreseeability necessary to hold a possessor liable for the criminal assault
of a third party. Id. at 662-63. An unknown assailant shot plaintiff Isaacs, a physician, at night
while Isaacs entered his car in a hospital parking lot across from the emergency room. Id. at
662. Isaacs appealed the trial court's grant of hospital's motion for nonsuit at the close of
plaintiff's case. Id. Isaacs had failed to introduce" any evidence of prior similar incidents on
defendant's premises. Id. Isacas had, however, introduced evidence that the hospital was
located in a high crime area, that thefts and assaults had taken place elsewhere on the hospital's
premises, especially near the emergency room, and that the parking lot had no security and was
dimly lit at the time of the shooting. Id. Isaacs also introduced testimony of two experts in
security matters who concluded that the hospital's security at the time of the shooting was
"totally inadequate." Id. The court criticized the prior similar incidents test as "flawed"
because it discouraged landowners from implementing security measures, prevented the first
victim from recovering, led to arbitrary results because of disputes about when prior crimes are
sufficiently similar, and removed too many cases from the jury. Id. at 665. Applying its new
test for possessors' liability, the court found that a jury could reasonably have concluded that
an assault on Dr. Isaacs was foreseeable and that the trial court had erred in finding the assault
was not foreseeable as a matter of law. Id.
55. See Clohesy, 694 A.2d at 1021, 1030 (reversing trial court's grant of defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment and citing evidence, including that store permitted park-
ing in area impossible to observe from inside store, as sufficient to present jury question of
store's negligence); Torres, 670 P.2d at 236 (reversing trial court's grant of motion to dis-
miss and ruling that plaintiff's assertions, including that bank depository's "hidden location"
exposed plaintiff to unreasonable risk of criminal attack, was sufficient to state claim for negli-
gence).
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taken, such as cameras or guards;"' lighting; 7 the character of the business
itself;" the character of neighboring businesses and the surrounding neighbor-
hood; 9 and all prior crimes, violent and nonviolent, on or near the premises.60
Thus, courts that use the totality of the circumstances test greatly expand the
range of circumstances that could constitute notice sufficient to alert a pos-
sessor of the need to take measures to protect patrons from criminal attack.
D. The Balancing Test
One commentator called the totality of the circumstances test "pro-plain-
tiff' and said it marked the culmination of the transition from a strict to a
broad interpretation of foreseeability.6" Scholars and courts have criticized
the test for providing too broad a standard for imposing liability and for
coming close to imposing strict liability on business possessors for any crim-
inal attacks suffered by customers while on the premises.6' Such a rule would
violate the maxim that business possessors are not the insurers oftheir custom-
ers' safety.63
In Ann M v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center,' less than a decade after
announcing the totality of the circumstances rule, the California Supreme
Court narrowed its approach to foreseeability.6" Reexamining its totality of
56. See Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 662 (noting evidence of insufficient number of guards and
cameras).
57. See Seibert, 856 P.2d at 1340 (remanding to determine what role insufficient lighting
played in shooting).
58. See Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 661 (noting hospital emergency rooms, surrounding areas, and
nearby parking lots had high potential for violent acts).
59. See id. (noting hospital emergency rooms, surrounding areas, and nearby parking lot
had high potential for violent acts); Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 694 A.2d 1017,
1021 (N.J. 1997) (noting evidence that neighboring gas station and liquor store, as gathering
places for loiterers, should have alerted grocery store to need for parking lot security).
60. See Clohesy, 694 A2d at 1021 (noting evidence of all prior crimes on or near store's
premises for preceding two and one-half years, including shoplifting and driving while intoxi-
cated, and noting increasing number of offenses).
61. See Welch, supra note 42, at 1061-62 (identifying Isaacs v. Huntington Mem'l Hosp.
Inc., 695 P.2d 653, 665 (1985) as "landmark decision").
62. See McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. Partnership, 937 S.W.2d 891,900 (Tenn. 1996)
(noting with approval criticism of totality of circumstances test that it "effectively impos[es] an
unqualified duty to protect customers in areas experiencing any significant level of criminal
activity" (citations omitted)).
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f (1965) (providing that "the
possessor is not the insurer of the visitor's safety").
64. 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1993)
65. Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207,215 (Cal. 1993) ("revisit[ing]"
totality of the circumstances rule and announcing new factors in analysis). At issue inAnn M
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the circumstances approach, the court reemphasized that the possessor's duty
is "determined by balancing the foreseeability of the harm against the burden
of the duty to be imposed."' Thus, because of uncertainty about where and
when crime will occur and because of the costs of hiring security guards, the
court found that prior violent incidents will quite likely be necessary before
a business possessor will be in breach of his duty for failure to hire security
guards.67 However, even absent prior violent incidents, a possessor might still
have a duty, for example, to improve lighting and to cut back shrubbery.'
This approach has had some appeal for other courts. Recently, for example,
the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected its own imminent harm test in favor of
the Pacific Plaza analysis, identifying it as a "balancing approach.i
69
LI. Comparing the Fault of the Intentional Tortfeasor
Pamela B. was in the underground parking garage ofher apartment build-
ing - promoted by its management as a "security" building - when a paroled
murderer and rapist, Prince Veal, grabbed her from behind, put a knife to her
v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center was whether Pacific Plaza was negligent for failing to institute
security patrols in the common areas of the shopping center. Id. at 211. PlaintiffAnn M. sued
the possessors after an assailant raped her inside the photograph developing store where she
worked. Id. at 210. The rape occurred shortly after Ann M., the only employee on duty, opened
the store for business at 8:00 am. Id. Ann M. claimed that the regular presence of transients
at the shopping center made the attack foreseeable. Id. 211. Acknowledging that Pacific Plaza
indeed owed a duty to protect Ann M., the employee of a tenant, the court rejected Ann M.'s
claims that the shopping center was in breach of that duty by failing to hire security guards. Id.
215. Because the court found it difficult or impossible "to envision any locale open to the
public where the occurrence of violent crime seems improbable," the court revisited the totality
of the circumstances rule. Id. The court then emphasized that the scope of the duty is deter-
mined in part by the burden of the duty imposed. Id. Cases in which the burden of preventing
future harm is great, such as hiring guards, may require a high degree of foreseeability. Id.
Conversely, cases in which there are strong public policy reasons for preventing harm or in
which the harm can be prevented by simple means may require a lesser degree of foreseeability.
Id. at 215-16. Because of the cost of hiring security guards, then, rarely would a landowner be
in breach for failure to hire guards absent prior similar incidents of violent crime. Id. at 215.
Thus, Because Ann. M. could not show the occurrence of prior crimes on the premises or that
Pacific Plaza knew of any such prior crimes, the court affirmed summary judgment for Pacific
Plaza. Id. at 216.
66. Id. at 215 (citation omitted).
67. Id.
68. Welch, supra note 42, at 107-08 (voicing approval and providing illustrations of
impact of balancing test).
69. See McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. Partnership, 937 S.W.2d 891, 901 (Tenn. 1997)
(stating that California's "balancing" approach "retains some beneficial features of both the
prior incidents and totality of the circumstances tests, but avoids some of the problems associ-
ated with each"). The balancing test is a clear expression of the Hand Formula. See infra notes
180-83 and accompanying text (describing Hand Formula).
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throat, raped and sodomized her, and then locked her naked in a car trunk."
At trial, the jury attributed four percent of the fault for Pamela B.'s injuries
to her attacker and one percent to his accomplice. The jury allocated ninety-
five percent of the fault to the landlord and to the management company.
72
The landlord and management company appealed, arguing that substan-
tial evidence did not support the jury's apportionment of fault.73 The Califor-
nia Court of Appeal emphatically agreed.74 Among other things, the court
stated that the jury's apportionment of the majority of the fault to the pos-
sessor rather than to the rapist was irrational and defied common sense.
Thus, although the court affirmed on the question of defendants' negligence,
it reversed and remanded with directions to conduct a new trial on the appor-
tionment of damages. 6
Pamela B. is relevant not because of any precedential value,77 but be-
cause the court's assertion that reasonable factfinders would apportion the
vast majority of the blame for the plaintiffs injuries to the intentional tortfea-
sor" is both commonsensical and prohibited by law in a majority of states.
When a horribly injured plaintiff such as Pamela B. seeks to lay the blame for
her injuries at the feet of a business possessor, no doubt that possessor seeks
in turn to point to the intentional tortfeasor as the actor who caused and is
responsible for the plaintiff's injuries. Unfortunately for possessors, at the
time of this writing only ten states have ruled that when one party seeks to
hold another liable for negligently failing to control a third party who acted
intentionally, factfinders may compare the fault of all three parties. These
70. See Pamela B. v. Hayden, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 147, 149-50 (Ct. App. 1994) (describing
attack).
71. Id. at 149.
72. Id. Thejury also awarded damages of $12 million. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 158-60.
75. Id. The court said "[r]ationally we cannot leave our common sense on the courthouse
steps, which is what we would have to do to affirm the allocation made by the jury in this case."
Id. at 159. Prince Veal caused Pamela B.'s injuries, said the court, and "it is pure sophistry to
talk in terms of [the defendants'] comparatively minor negligence as the cause of Pamela's
suffering." Id. at 158.
76. Id. at 160.
77. Review granted by Pamela B. v. Hayden, 880 P.2d 112 (Cal. 1994). Review dis-
missed and cause remanded to the Court ofAppeals, Pamela B. v. Hayden, 889 P.2d 539 (Cal.
1995). Under California Rules of Court 976, 977, and 979, the Pamela B. opinion carries no
precedential authority.
78. Pamela B. v. Hayden, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 147, 160 (Ct. App. 1994) (asserting, before
remanding for new trial on apportionment of damages, that "when one defendant's conduct-was
intentional and another defendant's conduct was negligent, it is reasonable to assume the jury
will apportion fault so that the one who acted intentionally should bear most if not all of the
blame" (citations and internal quotations omitted)).
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states are Arizona, 9 California, ° Colorado,81 Connecticut," Hawaii,83 Ken-
tucky, 4 New Jersey," New Mexico,86 New York, 7 and Utah.ss In addition,
Louisiana allows apportionment between negligent and intentional tortfeasors
on a case-by-case basis.89 Other states do not allow the apportionment of fault
79. See Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449, 451-53 (Ariz. 1998) (approving
apportionment of fault as twenty-five percent to murderer and seventy-five percent to city for
failure of 911 operator properly to dispatch police).
80. See Weidenfeller v. Star and Garter, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 14,16 (Ct. App. 1991) (affirming
apportionment of fault as seventy-five percent to assailant, twenty percent to defendant bar, five
percent to plaintiff in unprovoked shooting in parking lot).
81. See Harvey v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 938 P.2d 34, 39 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (finding,
in action resulting from sexual battery by chiropractor, Colorado comparative fault statute
intended to apply when one party at fault for negligently failing to use reasonable care to
prevent foreseeable harm resulting from intentional tort of another - even if other is designated
non-party).
82. See Bhinder v. Sun Co., Inc., 717 A.2d 202,208 (Conn. 1998) (finding that although
state statute did not allow apportionment of fault between negligent and intentional tortfeasor,
state common law allowed such comparison in murder of convenience store employee).
83. See Ozaki v. Association of Apartment Owners, 954 P.2d 644, 649 (Haw. 1998)
(affirming that Hawaii's modified comparative fault statute does not apply only to actions
proceeding entirely in negligence, but also applies when different theories of recovery are
advanced against different defendants in case in which murderer was assessed ninety-two
percent of fault, victim/tenant five percent of fault, and owner three percent of fault).
84. See Roman Catholic Diocese v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286, 291 (Ky. Ct App. 1998)
(affiming apportionment of fault between negligent and intentional tortfeasors as Diocese
seventy-five percent for negligent supervision and teacher twenty-five percent for sexual assault
of student).
85. See Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A-2d 222, 231 (N.J. 1991) (approving apportionment
of fault between restaurant for negligence, patrons for assault of plaintiff; and plaintiff himself
for contributory negligence after plaintiff yelled at group of patrons who were throwing rocks
at sign and who then attacked him).
86. See Barth v. Coleman, 878 P.2d 319, 321-22 (N.M. 1994) (reversing trial court and
remanding for determination of intentional tortfeasor's fault for punching plaintiff's nose in bar
fight).
87. See Siler v. 146 Montague Assocs., 652 N.Y.S.2d 315, 321 (App. Div. 1997)
(remanding for apportionment of liability between negligent landlord and intentional tortfeasor
who assaulted plaintiff in her apartment).
88. See Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1998) (finding, after plaintiff was
assaulted outside her employer's store, that state comparative fault statute encompasses both
negligent and intentional conduct but does not allow apportionment of fault to unknown,
nonparty assailants).
89. See Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Assocs., Ltd., 650 So. 2d 712, 720 (La. 1994)
(denying on public policy grounds request of defendant apartment complex management
company to apportion fault to intentional tortfeasor who raped plaintiff tenant, but affirming that
trial courts may make decision on whether to allow comparison of fault between intentional and
negligent tortfeasors on case by case basis).
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between negligent and intentional tortfeasors. 90
The modem rule barring comparison of fault between intentional and
negligent tortfeasors has allowed courts to escape the harsh results of contrib-
utory negligence when that doctrine operates as a complete bar to a plaintiff's
recovery.91 The policy of forbidding comparison of intentional and negligent
fault originally sought to deter intentional tortfeasors and facilitate the com-
pensation of victims.' One who battered and robbed a plaintiff, then, could
not escape liability in a resulting civil trial by offering a contributory negli-
gence defense, asserting that the plaintiff should have been more careful to
conceal the amount of cash in his wallet. Another justification for not allow-
ing intentional tortfeasors to assert contributory negligence as a defense is that
negligent fault and intentional fault are different in kind; thus, factfinders
cannot compare the two.93 However, recent commentators have generally
rejected arguments against allowing comparison of intentional and negligent
fault.94 Instead, at least two commentators have argued for allowing compara-
tive fault in intentional tort cases, at least in limited circumstances.9'
90. See, e.g., Whitehead v. Food Max, 163 F.3d 265, 280 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding
Mississippi law did not allow actions of intentional tortfeasors to be allocated as fault in
abduction of mother and daughter from parking lot); Merrill Crossings Assocs. v. McDonald,
705 So. 2d 560, 562-63 (Fla. 1997) (affirming trial court ruling precluding apportioning fault
of intentional tortfeasor who shot plaintiff in parking lot); Kansas State Bank & Trust Co. v.
Specialized Transp. Servs., Inc., 819 P.2d 587, 605-06 (Kan. 1991) (affirming that Kansas law
did not allow factfinders to compare bus driver's intentional conduct to school district's and
transportation company's negligence in failing to protect mentally retarded six-year-old from
sexual molestation); Flood v. Southland Corp., 616 N.E.2d 1068, 1071 (Mass. 1993) (finding
state comparative fault statute inapplicable to negligent security action resulting from stabbing
outside convenience store); Fulwiler v. Schneider, 662 N.E.2d 82, 89 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995)
(stating that Ohio's comparative negligence statute does not apply to claims involving inten-
tional torts in case of bar bouncer assaulting patron); see also HEMY WOODS & BETH DE ,
CoMIARATNVE FAULT § 7.1, at 151-56 (3d ed. 1996) (providing somewhat dated state-by-state
analysis).
91. Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 32, at 6-7 (explaining "uniform rejection" of contribu-
tory negligence defense when defendant acted intentionally).
92. See id. at 18-20 (same); Hollister, supra note 32, at 145-50 (explaining deterrence
policy).
93. Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 32, at 11-18 (explaining difference in kind distinc-
tion); see also Hollister, supra note 32, at 135-42 (same).
94. See Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 32, at 12-18 (rejecting difference in kind argu-
ment); Hollister, supra note 32, at 13542 (same).
95. See Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 32, at 32-40 (advocating use of comparative fault
in certain intentional nuisance actions); Hollister, supra note 32, at 150-59 (describing typology
of cases in which comparison is appropriate); see also Reginald R. White, III, Comparative
Responsibility Sometimes: The Louisiana Approach to Comparative Apportionment and
Intentional Torts, 70 TuL. L. REv. 1501,1533-36 (1996) (proposing reformation ofLouisiana's
current "comparative responsibility sometimes" system without barring comparison). But see
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Prohibiting a possessor from defending a negligent security action by
comparing its responsibility with the responsibility of the intentional tortfea-
sor may also work a shocking result. Consider, for example, a hypothetical
case in which an automobile driven negligently by a third party customer
struck the plaintiff in the possessor's grocery store parking lot. When the
plaintiff sues the grocery store for maintaining an unsafe parking lot, the
possessor would be able to join the negligent driver, have the jury apportion
the driver a share of the fault, and thereby reduce the possessor's liability.
However, imagine that the third party driver intentionally ran down, abducted,
and murdered the plaintiff. In the resulting negligent security action, the
possessor would be unable to compare the responsibility of the murderer.
Thus, when the third party's fault becomes unspeakably worse, the share of
the responsibility the jury would likely apportion to the possessor becomes
much greater.
As noted above, at least ten states do allow juries to compare the fault of
an intentional and a negligent tortfeasor, and five of the ten states have done
so only in the last two years.96 The impact this new doctrine will have on
negligent security actions is unclear.' For example, when the state's adoption
of a comparative negligence regime has abolished joint and several liability,
plaintiffs may be faced with the unhappy prospect of having juries apportion
a majority of fault to a party who, if he can be located, is essentiallyjudgment-
proof.9" Nonetheless, the abolition of contributory fault as a bar to a plaintiffs
Fiset, supra note 32, at 737 (arguing apportionment of fault of intentional tortfeasor would
"render duty to protect another a nullity").
96. See supra notes 79-89 (citing state cases allowing comparison of intentional and
negligent fault).
97. See Pamela B. v. Hayden, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 147, 160 (Ct App. 1994) (stating that
"when one defendant's conduct was intentional and another defendant's conduct was negligent,
it is reasonable to assume the jury will apportion fault so that the one who acted intentionally
should bear most if not all of the blame" (citations and internal quotations omitted)); Veazey v.
Elmwood Plantation Assocs. Ltd., 650 So. 2d 712, 719 (La. 1994) (explaining that because "any
rational juror will apportion the lion's share of the fault to the intentional tortfeasor when
instructed to compare the fault of a negligent and an intentional tortfeasor," trial court was
correct to preclude jury from apportioning intentional fault and thereby reducing incentive for
lessor to protect tenants from attack).
98. See Robert S. Glazier & Barbara GreenAllocaingFault in NegligentSecurity Cases,
TRIAI, Jan. 1997, at 54, 55-56 (advising readers of attempts by defense bar to apportion fault of
intentional tortfeasors and suggesting strategies for avoiding such apportionment). However,
some early cases show results contrary to this 'lion's share' expectation. See, e.g., Hutcherson
v. City of Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449, 451-53 (Ariz. 1998) (approving apportionment of fault as
twenty-five percent to murderer and seventy-five percent to city for failure of 911 operator
properly to dispatch police); Rosh v. Cave Imaging Sys., Inc., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 136, 139-40 (Ct.
App. 1994) (affirming jury's apportionment of fault as seventy-five percent to security company
and twenty-five percent to shooter in case where security guards failed, despite repeated requests,
to remove disgruntled former employee from premises); Roman Catholic Diocese v. Secter, 966
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recovery and the weakness of the difference in kind argument mean that the
justification for forbidding comparison of intentional and negligent fault no
longer holds.
IV Comparing the Plaintiffs Fault
Susan Marisconish was alone and asleep in her room at the Ron-Ric
motel near a high-crime neighborhood in Chicago when a knock at the door
awakened her at 1:00 a.m.' Marisconish thought her fianc6, whom she
planned to see graduate from the Great Lakes Naval Training Station, might
be knocidng.' e However, her fianc6 had said he was spending the night on
base, and she saw no one through the peephole." Thinking her fianc6 was en
route to the innkeeper's apartment to get a key to the room, Marisconish
opened the door.'" The man on the other side was a stranger. 3
The man asked for a glass of water and entered the room while she went
to get him one from the bathroom." 4 Complaining that the water was not cold
enough, he went to the bathroom himself, leaving Marisconish between the
bathroom and the door of her room.'0" There was no telephone in the rm ."
She hid her purse, and a few minutes passed." 7 She declined the man's
invitation to join him in the bathroom."° He emerged from the bathroom
naked from the waist down." She fled out ofthe room, whereupon he chased
her down, dragged her back to the room, and raped and sodomized her."'
S.W.2d 286, 291 (Ky. Ct App. 1998) (affirming assessment of seventy-five percent of fault to
Diocese for negligent supervision and twenty-five percent of fault to teacher for sexually
assaulting student). But see Ozake v. Association of Apartment Owners, 954 P.2d 644, 646
(Haw. 1998) (discussing jury apportionment of ninety-two percent of fault to murderer, five
percent of fault to victim/tenant, three percent of fault to possessor). Also, the Restatement of
Torts: Apportionment of Liability addresses the problem and would impose joint and several
liability on a person "who is liable to another based on a failure to protect the other from the
specific risk of an intentional tort." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABIITY
§ 24 (Proposed Final Draft (Revised) (March 22,1999)).
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At trial, the court instructed Marisconish's jury to compare the motel's
fault with that of the plaintiff, but not with the fault of the intentional tort-
feasor."' The defense argued that the plaintiff had been at fault, for example,
in failing to flee when the rapist was in the bathroom."' Marisconish coun-
tered that the innkeepers were negligent because they failed to warn her that
the hotel was near a high-crime neighborhood and because they failed to
provide parking lot security."' However, the jury found that Marisconish was
ninety-seven percent at fault for the attack and the innkeepers were only three
percent at fault. Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, upheld this
finding." 4
Ms. Marisconish's case raises issues central to this Note: (1) What
doctrine governs how factfinders determine whether a plaintiff is at least
partially at fault when suffering an intentional tort? (2) How should a judge
or jury properly compare a plaintiff's fault to the fault of the possessors?
(3) In jurisdictions that allow juries to apportion the fault of the intentional
tortfeasor, how should juries conduct that comparison?
A. Do Plaintiffs Have a Duty to Avoid Suffering an Intentional Tort?
A century ago, one commentator asserted that there was no duty to act
reasonably to avoid being harmed by an intentional tort." This position found
more recent expression by one court that claimed that "[a] person's obligation
to guard himself from injury caused by design is insignificant, if existent at all,
compared to his obligation to guard himself from injury caused by another's
simple lack of care."'1 6 Prosser also articulated a broad "no duty to anticipate
crime" rle."7 The idea that courts should not impose a duty to guard oneself
from criminal attack clearly stems from the now almost extinct system in which
111. Id. at 852. Illinois, as of the time of this writing, still does not allow the fault of the
intentional tortfeasor to be compared under its comparative fault statute. See supra notes 79-89
and accompanying text (identifying states that allow comparison of intentional and negligent
fault).
112. Wassell, 865 F.2d at 853.
113. Id. at 853, 855.
114. Id. at 852, 855.
115. See CHARI.Es FISK BEACH, JR.,A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GEN C § 65, at 104 (3d ed., Albany, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1899) (arguing that, because defense
of contributory negligence was not available to intentional tortfeasor, individuals had no duty
to avoid intentional harm).
116. Melendres v. Solares, 306 N.W.2d 399,403 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
117. See PROSSER, supra note 37, § 33, at 173-74 ("There is normally much less reason
to anticipate acts on the part of others which are malicious and intentionally damaging than
those which are merely negligent; and this is all the more true where, as is usually the case, such
acts are criminal.").
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contributory fault was a complete bar to recovery."' Indeed, a "no duty to
avoid an intentional tort" rule would be the mirror image of the rule that bars
intentional tortfeasors from asserting the defense of contributory fault.19
At least one commentator has argued that courts should not impose on a
plaintiff a duty to avoid becoming a victim of crime. Michael Bazyler, in an
article urging courts to impose a duty on businesses to protect patrons, argues
that imposing the duty to protect patrons on the landowner would be more
efficient than imposing a duty on the patrons to protect themselves. 2 ° Pa-
trons, Bazyler argued, have only one way to prevent themselves from becom-
ing victims of crime when on the premises of a business invitor: stay home
at night."' On the other hand, he argued, possessors have better access to
information about crime on the premises and have the ability directly to alter
conditions on the premises." Possessors also have many options available
to them to protect their patrons."2 They can provide guard services, fencing,
and better lighting, and they can vary their hours of operation. 2 Thus, the
duty to protect patrons from crime should fall not on the patrons, Bazyler
argued, but on the possessors." Whenthe Tennessee Supreme Court recently
adopted its balancing test for determining the foreseeability of crime on the
premises of business possessors, it noted Bazyler's argument approvingly.'26
However, as this Note demonstrates below, plaintiffi have a wide variety
of precautions available to them short of just staying home. Furthermore,
forcing the plaintiff or the possessor to shoulder the entire burden of acting
reasonably to prevent harm to plaintis is nonsensical."' Finally, because of
the rise of negligent security actions in this era of comparative fault, even in
118. See VICTORE. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVENEGLIGENCE § 1.1, at4 (1994) (indicating
that Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia are only states to retain contributory
negligence as complete bar to recovery).
119. See supra notes 77-95 and accompanying text (discussing rule prohibiting intentional
tortfeasors from asserting contributory negligence defense).
120. See Bazyler, supra note 42, at 747 (arguing, in context of imposing duty on landown-




124. Id. at 747-48.
125. Id.
126. See McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. Partnership, 937 S.W.2d 891, 903 n.10 (Tenn.
1997) (citing Bazyler, supra note 42, at 747).
127. Both possessors and plaintiffs may bear responsibility in slip and fall cases, for
example. See PAGE, supra note 17, at 143-44 (describing that although possessors owe duty
of care to protect plaintiffs from risk, possessors may assert affirmative defense of contributory
fault). Thus, it is unclear what argument might support imposing solely on possessors the duty
to prevent third party criminal acts.
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states forbidding the comparison of negligent and intentional fault, juries
regularly decide how to divide the fault of the plaintiff and the possessor in
such actions.
B. Reported Cases
An examination of reported decisions reveals at least four types of cases
in which the circumstances under which a criminal attack occurred apparently
influenced juries to find plaintiffs partially responsible for their own injuries.
First, juries have found a plaintiff at fault when the plaintiff was injured after
unwisely resisting criminal aggression. In Jones v. Tokhi,' for example, a
gunman shot plaintiff Timothy Jones in a restaurant parking lot after Jones
attempted to disarm the gunman.129 Jones and three friends went to the New
York Fried Chicken Restaurant at about 1:45 a.m. where they were greeted by
loiterers' taunts. 3° One man followed the four friends into the restaurant and
made threatening comments about robbing them. 11 After the man exited the
restaurant, he peered back in at them through a window." 2 The restaurant's
security guard refused to escort the friends out to their car despite their
requests that he do so.'33 When Jones and his friends walked out of the
restaurant, two men confronted them - the one who had followed them inside
was armed with a gun, and the other was saying, "Shoot one ofthe[m]. Shoot
one of them. Show them you ain't a punk." '134 Jones attempted to disarm the
man with the gun, and the man then shot Jones in the abdomen.'35 The jury
128. 535 N.W.2d 46 (Wis. Ct App. 1995).
129. Jones v. Tokhi, 535 N.W.2d 46,47-48 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (describing facts of case
in which gunman shot plaintiff in restaurant's parking lot after plaintiff attempted to disarm
gunman). In Tokhi, the issue was whether to sustain the trial court decision setting aside the
jury's finding that plaintiff was twenty percent at fault and restaurant was eighty percent at fault
after plaintiff was shot while trying to disarm a gunman outside a restaurant. Id. The plaintiff,
Jones, went with friends to the restaurant late at night, and the group was confronted in the
parking lot by a gunman. Id. The trial court ruled that Jones's decision to attempt to disarm the
gunman made Jones more negligent than the restaurant as a matter of law. Id. at 49. The
appellate court reasoned that Jones only tried to take control of the weapon when then gunman's
accomplice urged the gunman to shoot. Id. Thus, because the trial court could not support its
assertion that trying to disarm the gunman was negligent as a matter of law and the appellate
court found nothing disproportionate about the jury's apportionment of fault, the appellate court
reinstated the original verdict Id. at 50.
130. Id. at 47-48 (describing Jones as high school varsity basketball player, but not iden-
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found Jones twenty percent at fault for his injuries and the restaurant eighty
percent at fault.136 Although the trial judge set aside the verdict because he
found that Jones's negligence exceeded the restaurant's as a matter of law, the
appellate court reinstated the original verdict. 3
Second, juries have found the plaintiff at least partially to blame when
the plaintiff appears to have provoked aggression. In Gould v. Taco Bell, 3 '
for example, plaintiff, Rosie Gould, and her friend, Theresa Holmberg, went
to a restaurant at 11:30 p.m.139 The only other patrons in the restaurant, a
party of six including Karen Brown, "engaged in loud, crude, and vulgar
conversation, designed to be overheard and to shock Gould and Holmberg."'
40
Gould and Holmberg made no comment to Brown or to her companions
during the unrestrained conversation. 4' However, when Brown and her
companions got up and started toward the exit, Brown stopped and said,
"Those two white bitches over there think they're hot shit."' 42 Gould, appar-
136. Id.
137. Id. at 49 (explaining that Jones tried to disarm gunman only when facing gun's barrel
and hearing other assailant urge gunman to fire). Also, exceptionally unwise resistance by
plaintiffs may result in defense verdicts. See Cook v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 354 A.2d 507, 507-
08 (D.C. Ct. App. 1976) (affirming directed verdict for defense in case where plaintiff grabbed
purse-snatcher's arm, yelled at him, then pursued purse-snatcher and his two accomplices in
attempt to retrieve missing twenty dollar bill and grabbed thief's arm again, at which point thief
then struck plaintiff). Also, recall that in Erichsen, a plaintiff attempted to retrieve her purse
by reaching into the mugger's car and suffered injuries after she became entangled in a seatbelt
strap. See Erichsen v. No-Frills Supermarket, Inc., 518 N.W. 2d 116,118 (Neb. 1994) (describ-
ing plaintiff's injuries); see also supra notes 1-11and accompanying text (describing facts of
case). No-Frills Supermarkets eventually won a defense verdict at trial. Telephone Interview
with Brian Welch, attorney for No-Frills Supermarkets, Cassem, Tiemey, Adams, Gotch &
Douglas, Omaha (Feb. 9 1999). But cf. Seibert v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc., 856 P.2d 1332,
1334 (Kan. 1993) (noting plaintiff's behavior did not bar recovery when armed man confronted
plaintiff in underground parking lot and plaintiff screamed and "either dropped or throw the can
of cola at her assailant" who then shot her).
138. 722 P.2d 511 (Kan. 1986).
139. Gould v. Taco Bell, 722 P.2d 511,514 (Kan. 1986) (affirming, in case where plaintiff
was beaten by another customer, that restaurant owed plaintiff affirmative duty of care including
duty to warn plaintiff of danger that might reasonably be anticipated). In Gould, the issue was
whether a restaurant breached its duty of care after it failed to warn plaintiff of the danger of
attack from another customer. Id. at 515 A customer, who employees knew had started a fight
in the restaurant two weeks before, insulted plaintiff. Id. at 513. Plaintiff's response provoked
a beating. Id The court reasoned that, because the management knew the customer had started
a fight in the restaurant previously, the restaurant had an affirmative duty to warn plaintiff of
danger even though plaintiff had not been inside the restaurant very long and the events leading
to the beating were fast-paced. Id. at 516. Thus, the court held that substantial evidence
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ently shocked, asked, "Are you talking to us? '143 When Brown answered,
'Yes," Gould invited her to "please come over here and repeat yourself."1
14
Thereupon, Brown rushed over and struck Gould in the face.1 4' Gould re-
sponded by calling Brown a "nigger."'' Brown then battered Gould relent-
lessly. 47 The jury assessed forty-nine percent of the fault to Gould. 4 '
A third situation in which triers of fact have found the plaintiff at fault
in negligent security actions has arisen when the plaintiff has failed to keep
a door properly secured. The jury's decision in Ledbetter v. Concord General
Corp.149 provides such an example. 5  Plaintiff Lucy Ledbetter was asleep in
the motel room she was sharing with her granddaughter when a man awakened
Ledbetter by holding his hand over her mouth. 5' The man then raped and
abducted Ledbetter.' 52 As her captor drove Ledbetter out of the motel parking
lot, she jumped from the moving car, sustaining additional injuries. 53 Law
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 514.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. The jury also found Taco Bell fifty-one percent at fault. Id. Taco Bell employees
declined to intervene in the assault and also declined to call police until Gould's companion
threatened to jump over the counter to use the phone when told it was "not for public use." Id.
Allowing a plaintiff's provocative words or deeds to affect the outcome of his or her case is
hardly a recent development, however. A number of states have long allowed factfinders to
consider a plaintiff's conduct in reducing that plaintiff's actual or compensatory damages. See
Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 32, at 26-32 (discussing early and modem cases); see also
Wijngaarde v. Parents of Guy, 720 So. 2d 6, 12 (La. App. 1998) (finding sixteen-year-old
female plaintiff with broken jaw ten percent at fault for, among other things, taunting smaller
male adversary by calling him "whore" and "coward" for wanting to fight girl); Comeau v.
Currier, 616 NXE.2d 1091, 1093-94 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (remanding for new trial because
trial judge failed to give jury instruction that provocation can mitigate damages in assault and
battery case); Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 233 (N.J. 1991) (recognizing jury apportion-
ment of thirty percent of fault to patron of bar who allegedly cursed group of other patrons who
were throwing rocks at sign in parking lot and who responded by attacking plaintiff, but
remanding for new trial for apportionment of intentional tortfeasors' fault).
149. 665 So. 2d 1166 (La. 1996).
150. Ledbetter v. Concord Gen. Corp., 665 So. 2d 1166, 1168 (La. 1996) (describing case
in which plaintiff was raped and abducted from motel room). In Ledbetter, the issue was
whether the assault and battery exclusion to the motel's insurance policy excluded coverage of
plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 1168-69. An assailant raped the plaintiff, Ledbetter, and abducted her
from a motel room. Id. at 1167-68. The court found that because rape necessarily included
battery, Ledbetter's damages from the rape were not covered by the insurance policy. Id. at
1170. However, because abduction does not necessarily involve battery, the court held that the
insurer was liable for damages resulting from the abduction. Id.
151. Id. at 1168.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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enforcement officers who investigated the crime found no evidence that the
man had forced open Ledbetter's motel room door.'54 Ledbetter gave state-
ments to investigators shortly after the attack in which she remembered
locking the chain before retiring, but she expressed uncertainty about whether
she had locked the door knob.155 Investigators concluded that Ledbetter
indeed had not engaged the door knob lock before she went to sleep.5 6 With
the door knob unlocked, the rapist easily defeated the chain lock, which the
motel had improperly installed. 57 In a bench trial, the judge assessedLedbetter's fault at thirty-five percent. 5
Finally, juries have found plaintiffs at fault for placing themselves in a
location that they knew or should have known was dangerous. Thus, for
example, in the Florida case of Hardee v. Cunningham & Smith, Inc.,' assail-
ants stabbed, beat, and robbed the plaintiff while he washed his car at a self-
service car wash.'6" The incident occurred at 8:00 on a March evening."
Although plaintiff Daniel Hardee disclaimed any actual knowledge of prior





158. Id. Juries have found plaintiffs who have failed to keep doors properly secured at
fault in a number of other cases. See Wassell v. Adams, 865 F2d 849, 856 (7th Cir. 1989)
(affirming jury verdict finding plaintiff rape victim ninety-seven percent at fault for opening
motel room door to stranger in middle of night); Harrison v. Housing Resources Mgmt., Inc.,
588 So. 2d 64, 65 (Fla. Dist Ct App. 1991) (noting jury finding that plaintiff rape victim was
twenty-five percent at fault for failure to install her own lock after previous unforced entry into
her apartment, but remanding case for new trial on all issues in spite of fact that plaintiff only
wanted new trial on damages); Green Cos. v. DiVincenzo, 432 So. 2d 86, 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (noting jury found plaintiff twenty-five percent at fault for his own injuries for not
locking his office door when he stepped across the hall to go to the bathroom after normal
working hours, returned to his office, and assailant beat him).
159. 679 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. Dist Ct App. 1996).
160. Hardee v. Cunningham & Smith, Inc., 679 So. 2d 1316, 1317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (affirming jury's apportionment of sixty-eight percent of fault to plaintiff in case where
assailants stabbed, beat, and robbed plaintiff who had used carwash in dangerous neighborhood
at night). In Hardee, the issue was whether substantial evidence supported the jury's finding
that plaintiff was sixty-eight percent at fault for his own injuries resulting from a brutal robbery.
Id. Plaintiff, who had lived in the area of the car wash for twenty years and had visited the car
wash approximately thirty times, was stabbed, beaten, and robbed when using the car wash in
the evening. Id. The court noted that allowing a jury to apportion a majority of the fault of an
attack to a plaintiff who went to a location he knew to be dangerous could serve the goal of
preventing injuries. Id. at 1318. Thus, the court reasoned that because plaintiff either knew or
should have known that the area around the car wash was dangerous, knew there would be no
employees at the car wash, and went at night, the jury's finding was not contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence. Id.
161. Id. at 1367.
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and had been to the car wash approximately thirty times. 62 At trial, Hardee
presented evidence ofprior incidents at the car wash including drug trafficking,
prostitution, and violent crime, crimes the court suggested the local media
would have reported." The possessor admitted knowledge of three or four
previous attacks atthe car wash, including a "stabbing/robbery' five days prior
to the attack on the plaintiff, knowledge the possessor admitted was sufficient
to support a jury finding of the possessor's own negligence.'" Nonetheless,
the jury found Hardee sixty-eight percent at fault for his own injuries."'
On appeal, the court acknowledged that the jury finding was apparently
unprecedented, but it affirmed that a plaintiff could be responsible for the bulk
of his injuries merely for placing himself on premises he knew or should have
known were dangerous." In explaining its ruling, the court reasoned that
although it was concerned with compensating victims, preventing injuries was
also a worthy goal. 67 Therefore, because allowing the jury to apportion
Hardee a share of the fault for visiting an unattended car wash in a dangerous
neighborhood at night could promote greater caution by potential plaintiffs,
the court allowed the jury's apportionment of fault to stand. 6 "
C. Determining Plaintiffs Fault
Scholarly discussion of how properly to assess plaintiffs' fault in negli-
gent security actions is virtually nonexistent.'69 This leaves unaddressed
important questions of law. For example, it is now unclear what analysis a
court should properly employ when responding to a defendant's motion for
summary judgment or directed verdict that asserts, as a matter of law, that the
plaintiff was responsible for a majority of his own injuries in a negligent
security action. The same is also true for courts reviewing a decision at trial
to grant a plaintiff's motion for directed verdict on the question of his own
comparative fault. Furthermore, judges wishing merely to leave the issue of
a plaintiffs comparative fault in the hands of the jury have been unable to call








169. See KAMINSKY, supra note 17, at 23 (seeming to dismiss plaintiffs fault by calling
comparative negligence "non-issue"); PAGE, supra note 17, § 11, at 291-314 (discussing in
some detail possessor's duty to prevent criminal attacks, but neglecting to address issue of
comparative fault); Glazier & Green, supra note 98, at 55-56 (focusing only on question of
avoiding apportionment of intentional tortfeasor's fault).
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on the matter. An examination of the relevant case law and how traditional
tort doctrines of contributory negligence and comparative fault apply to a
plaintiff's conduct in a negligent security action sheds light on these previ-
ously unaddressed questions.
Apportioning a plaintiff's fault against that of other parties requires two
separate inquiries. A threshold question is whether a plaintiff was at all at
fault. If so, the factfinder would then conduct a second inquiry in order to
compare the fault of the plaintiff to that of the defendant or defendants.
1. Whether Plaintiff Was at Least Partially at Fault
Under the Uniform Comparative Fault Act (UCFA), "any contributory
fault chargeableto the claimant diminishes proportionatelythe amount awarded
as compensatory damages for an injury attributable to the claimant's contribu-
tory fault, but does not bar recovery."1 ' The UCFA defines "fault" to include
"acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward the
person or property of the actor or others" as well as "unreasonable failure to
avoid an injury orto mitigate damages."'1 1 Furthermore, the legal requirement
of causation applies to contributory fault as it does to negligence."' Thus, a
determination of a plaintiffs fault in a comparative fault regime employs
contributory negligence principles without allowing findings of contributory
negligence to operate as a complete bar to recovery. 73
The Restatement directs that contributory negligence inquiries be con-
ducted under the familiar "reasonable man under like circumstances"
standard."' Significantly, theRestatement describes two types of contributory
fault.175 One type is conduct akin to voluntary assumption ofthe risk.1 6 The
170. UNFORMCOMPARATIVEFAULTAcT § 1(a)(1977).
171. Id. § 1(b).
172. Id.
173. At least in modified comparative fault jurisdictions, contributory negligence that is
at least fifty or fifty-one percent of the total fault still operates as a total bar to recovery. See
WOODS & DEERE, supra note 90, § 4.3, at 84-85 (describing two modified comparative negli-
gence systems).
174. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 464 (1965).
175. Id. § 466.
The plaintiff's contributory negligence may be either (a) an intentional and unrea-
sonable exposure of himself to danger created by the defendant's negligence, of
which danger the plaintiff knows or has reason to know, or (b) conduct which, in
respects other than those stated in Clause (a), falls short of the standard to which
the reasonable man should conform in order to protect himself from harm.
Id.
176. See id. at cmt. d (noting form of contributory negligence frequently called "voluntary
assumption of risk").
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other type is conduct more like "negligence" in which plaintiffs (1) unreason-
ably fail to pay attention to discover danger in their surroundings, (2) unrea-
sonably fail to avoid danger once discovered, or (3) unreasonably fail to take
precautions to avoid future danger.1"
As described above, the circumstances under which factfinders have held
plaintiffs partially at fault in negligent security actions appear to fit neatly into
the two species of contributory fault the Restatement describes. One who
chooses to wash his car at night at an unattended car wash in a neighborhood
he knows is dangerous, for example, voluntarily assumes at least part of the
risk.178 One who forgets to lock her motel room door before retiring fails to
make preparations a reasonable person would make to avoid possible future
danger.
179
What neither the cases nor the Restatement provide, however, is a frame-
work for coherently analyzing a plaintiff's fault. For example, the circum-
stances under which washing one's car at a self-service car wash constitutes
improper care for one's own safety are unclear. Is such conduct faulty only at
night? Only in a dangerous neighborhood? The circumstances under which
failing to lock the door knob of one's motel room door constitutes fault are also
unclear. Should the age and sex of the plaintiff contribute to a factfinder's
determination of fault? Should the plaintiffs familiarity with the neighbor-
hood? Thus, the circumstances that a jury should properly consider when
evaluating a plaintiff's conduct in a negligent security action need clarification.
a. The Hand Formula
In United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,' ° Judge Learned Hand offered
a formula that has long been a familiar method of evaluating a defendant's
negligence.' Hand's formula, briefly, is that one is negligent if the burden
177. The second type of fault described by section 466
usually consists of plaintiff's failure to pay reasonable attention to his surroundings
so as to discover the danger created by the defendant's negligence, or to exercise
reasonable care, diligence, and skill to avoid the danger when it is perceived, or to
make such preparations as a reasonable man would regard as necessary to enable
him to avoid a possible future danger.
Ia at cmt f.
178. See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text (describing case of plaintiff stabbed,
beaten, and robbed at car wash).
179. See supra notes 149-58 and accompanying text (describing case of plaintiff raped and
abducted after she failed properly to lock her motel room door).
180. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
181. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169,173 (2d Cir. 1947) (asserting that
defendant is liable for negligence when burden of preventing injury is less than loss multiplied
by probability of injury). In Carroll Towing, the court considered whether the possessor of a
barge was negligent for failing to have an employee on board the barge when it was tied to a
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of preventing the accident (B) is less than the probability of the accident
occurring (P) multiplied by the possible loss (L); thus, a defendant is negligent
ifB<PL.'82 Hand's formula is also useful for evaluating a plaintiff's deviation
from the standard of care necessary for his or her own safety."s Thus, in
negligent security actions, a plaintiff would be at least partially at fault if the
burden on the plaintiff of preventing the injury was less than the probability
of the injury multiplied by the potential loss.
(1) Potential Loss
The only one of the three Hand Formula factors that can be gauged with
certainty in negligent security actions is that of the potential loss, (L). The
viciousness and depravity of the criminal assaults risked by plaintiffs ventur-
ing onto the parking lots and into the motel rooms of possessors,' 84 for those
who survive, result in damages that juries regularly assess at over one million
dollars. 85
(2) Probability ofHarm
Assessing (P), the probability of a particular plaintiffs suffering a crim-
inal attack, is another matter altogether. As the California Supreme Court said
when articulating that state's balancing test for determining when possessors
breach a duty of care, violent crime is endemic, and it is almost impossible toimagine any locale open to the public where the occurrence of violent crime
seems improbable."8 6 Nonetheless, the probability of violent crime varies
from place to place.' One helpful construct for evaluating the circumstances
pier. Id. at 172. Through the negligence of a third party on board a tug, the barge, Anna C.,
broke loose, drifted into another ship, and was holed near her bottom. Id. at 171. Had an
employee been aboard the barge, the court found that the damage to the barge would not have
caused her to sink. Id. Propounding a "formula" for determining negligence, the court found
that the burden (B) of having an employee on the barge was less than the possible loss (L)
multiplied by the probability of an accident (P) during the daytime in New York harbor, then
in the "full tide of war activity." Id. at 173-74. Thus, the court held the owners of the barge
negligent for failing to have a "bargee" aboard. Id. at 174.
182. Id. at 173-74.
183. See David C. Sobelsohn, Comparing Fault, 60 IND. L.J 413, 420-21 (1985) (using
Hand formula to determine each party's deviation from standard of reasonable care).
184. See supra Part IV.3 (describing, in some detail, criminal attacks resulting in negligent
security actions).
185. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (reporting jury awards in negligent
security actions).
186. See Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207,215 (Cal. 1993) (comment-
ing on increasing randomness of violent attacks).
187. See David M. Kennedy, Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings,
and a Theory ofPrevention, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 449,459 (1997) (discussing year-long Minne-
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relevant to probability of injury is through division of those circumstances
into two broad categories: external facts and individual attributes.
The "external fact" most useful in predicting the occurrence of future
violent crime at a particular location is previous crime at that location."' 8 The
type of business, the volume of traffic, the dangerousness of the surrounding
neighborhood, and the level of security on the premises are also useful in
predicting future crime there. 89 Indeed, it seems that any of the "external
facts" useful in establishing crime as foreseeable to possessors under a totality
of the circumstances test also would be useful in establishing whether, in
general, the occurrence of crime should be foreseeable to plaintiffs."ro Thus,
in an unpatrolled parking lot behind a bar in a dangerous neighborhood, a
parking lot with a history of prior violent crimes, where drunk men loiter,
where overgrown shrubbery blocks the view of passing cars, and where
broken glass glitters dimly in the poor lighting, crime should be as foreseeable
to any plaintiff familiar with the neighborhood as to the possessor.
The circumstances under which faetfinders evaluate an actor's conduct
for negligence or for contributory negligence need not be limited, however,
to such "external facts." ' As commentators have observed, courts have long
allowed a "more or less" subjective standard to guide the inquiry into the
reasonableness of the actor's conduct in discreet areas of negligence law."9
Thus, when asking whether a reasonable person under like circumstances
would have acted as did a plaintiff or defendant, factfinders may take into
account such individual attributes as that actor's age, sex, and any physical
apolis study in which three percent of city's street addresses produced fifty percent of all calls
for police services and Boston study finding area consisting of four percent of city accounted
for twelve percent of city's armed robberies and more than quarter of city's youth homicides and
other serious crimes).
188. See Robert B. Homant & Daniel B. Kennedy, Foreseeability of Crime as a Factor in
Premises Liabilityfor Negligent Security, 17 TRIAL DIPL. 1. 81, 84 (1994) (describing factors
useful in predicting occurrence of crime and describing developing "criminology of place").
189. Id.
190. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text (describing totality of circumstances
test). Quite obviously, though, it would generally be more difficult for plaintiffs than for
possessors to know of prior criminal incidents on or near the premises. However, as illustrated
in Hardee v. Cunningham & Smith, a factfinder might reasonably find a plaintiff knew or should
have known of such prior crimes. See supra notes 159-68 (describing facts of Hardee v.
Cunningham &Smith, Inc., 679 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
191. See PROSSER, supra note 37, § 33, at 151 (indicating inquiry often moves beyond
mere examination of "external facts").
192. See id. (discussing attributes of reasonable man and noting that "circumstances" under
which negligence is evaluated, is "in many respects, a more or less subjective standard");
Fleming James, The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases, 16 Mo. L. REV. 1,
1 (1951) (introducing discussion of attributes of reasonable man by noting "old inquiry" of
whether negligence is subjective or objective).
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disabilities.193 Factfinders may also properly take into account knowledge that
a plaintiffpossessed or should have possessed, as there are certain facts every
adult with minimum intelligence will be presumed to know. 94 The standard
for mental capacity, however, remains an objective one, and the law will not
excuse those who fall below the minimum standard expected by the commu-
nity.9 However, those with superior knowledge or skills will be held to a
commensurate standard.
19
Thus, in applying the Hand Formula to a plaintiff in a negligent security
action, factfinders might assess the probability of injury by accounting for the
physical characteristics of and knowledge possessed by that plaintiff. Al-
though just how specific to the individual the evaluation of conduct should be
remains an open question,l" age, race, sex, and other attributes are predictors
of the likelihood of a particular person suffering a criminal attack.1 Also,
factfinders can properly take into consideration what the plaintiff knew about
prior crime on the premises and in the adjacent neighborhood.19 Finally, the
common knowledge expected of most experienced adults in the community
must include some awareness of crime.2"
193. See PROSSER, supra note 37, § 32, at 152 (discussing individual attributes that fact-
finders may consider in evaluating negligence).
194. See id. § 32, at 158-59 (noting, for example, that every adult with minimum of intelli-
gence has learned that "fire bums and water will drown").
195. See id. § 32, at 152-53 (noting minimum standard). Prosser asserts that
The fact that the individual is a congenital fool, cursed with inbuilt bad judgment,
or that in the particular instance, he did not stop and think, or that he is merely a
stupid ox, or of an excitable temperament which causes him to lose his head and get
rattled, obviously cannot be allowed to protect him from liability.
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
196. See id. § 32, at 161 (noting, for example, "a physician who is possessed of unusual
skill or knowledge must use care which is reasonable in the light of his special ability and
information, and may be negligent where an ordinary doctor would not").
197. See id. § 32, at 151 (discussing attributes of reasonable man and noting that "circum-
stances" under which negligence is evaluated yields "a more or less subjective standard");
James, supra note 192, at I (introducing discussion of attributes of reasonable man by noting
"old inquiry" of whether negligence is subjective or objective).
198. See Ronald V. Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention, 19 CRE & JUST. 91, 100-01
(1995) (discussing "lifestyle theory" that victimization is possible to predict not only by "socio-
demographic" characteristics such as age, race, sex, and place of residence, but by attributes of
victim's lifestyle such as consumption of alcohol in public places and use of public transporta-
tion).
199. See Hardee v. Cunningham & Smith, Inc., 679 So. 2d 1316,1328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (discussing plaintiff's knowledge of surrounding area).
200. See PROSSER, supra note 37, § 32, at 159 (asserting every adult will know "the normal
habits of human beings, including their propensities toward negligence and crime" (emphasis
added)).
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DeMyrick v. Guest Quarters Suite Hotels2 °1 provides an example of a
court's use of external facts and individual attributes in evaluating the proba-
bility of injury.2" In DeMyrick, the court denied a possessor's motion for
summary judgment on the plaintiff's comparative fault in part by taking into
account the plaintiffs physical size and experience in handling confronta-
tions. 3 DeMyrick was brought on behalf of decedent Rhoderick Rountree
who had worked as road manager for the musical group Boyz II Men, a
position that entailed overseeing the group's security.2
In DeMyrick, three young men gained access to the guest floors of a hotel
in the middle of the night in search of a party connected with the musical
group.2 °" The three awakened Rountree in his hotel room by their laughter
and loud talking." 6 Rountree, who was approximately six feet, three inches
tall and weighed over three hundred pounds, opened his door to investigate
and asked the men for identification when one indicated he worked for the
hotel. 7 When Rountree told the men to wait outside the door while he
retrieved something from his room, the three men instead walked down the
hall to the elevator.2"8 Rountree caught up to the men just as the elevator
doors were closing."° Upon entering the elevator, Rountree, then armed,
began punching and pistol-whipping the three young men.210 Eventually, one
of the three then produced his own handgun and killed Rountree."'
201. 944 F. Supp. 661 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
202. See DeMyrick v. Guest Quarters Suite Hotels, 944 F. Supp. 661,668 (N.D. IlM. 1996)
(declining to find on summary judgment that decedent in wrongful death action was more than
fifty percent at fault for leaving his hotel room and fighting with three men). In Detyrick, the
issue was whether the trial court should grant defendant hotel's summary judgment motion
asserting that plaintiff was, as a matter of law, responsible for more than fifty percent of the
fault in his own death. Id. at 667. Three men in search of a party awakened decedent inside his
hotel room in the middle of the night Id. at 663. The decedent, Rountree, who was in charge
of security for a musical group staying at the hotel, left his room, pursued the men to an elevator
by which they were attempting to leave the floor, and began beating and pistol-whipping them.
IM. One of the men shot Rountree. Id. The court reasoned that because Rountree had been a
very large man and had been experienced in dealing with unruly fans, a reasonable jury might
find that Rountree had not been fifty percent contributorily negligent in his own death. Id. at
668. Therefore, the court denied the hotel's motion for summary judgment. Id.
203. Id. at 667.







211. Id. at 665.
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Sued for negligent security by Rountree's estate, the hotel claimed on
summary judgment that Rountree's conduct was sufficiently negligent to
warrant removing the question of proximate cause from the jury as a matter
of law.212 However, the court ruled that, because of Rountree's size and
special experience in dealing with unruly fans, a reasonable jury might find
that his actions did not make Rountree at least fifty percent responsible for his
own injuries and therefore barred from any recovery.213 The court also noted
that the hotel in which the incident took place was "a full-service hotel."214
Presumably, this meant that ajury could evaluate Rountree's behavior in light
of Rountree having had a reasonable expectation that the hotel was providing
some security, that the risks he faced by stepping into the hallway were not as
great as they otherwise might have been had Rountree been stepping, for
example, out of a motel room and into the night air.
(3) Burdens of Precaution
One commentator has asserted that the only way a plaintiff could avoid
criminal attack was to "stay home at night."215 This claim neglects the fact
that criminals also attack during the day. The decreasing light as the sun goes
down and the increasing absence ofpeople in public as the night wears on are
merely the obvious external facts bearing on the probability of criminal attack.
However, in some cases the fact that the conduct in question happened at
night may have no appreciable impact on the magnitude and probability of
loss.216 The more relevant point is what precautions against suffering an
attack factfinders might reasonably expect of plaintiffs.
Fault lies in engaging in unreasonably risky conduct, not in merely
suffering - or causing others to suffer - an injury.21 7 Risk is unreasonable
when a precaution that likely would have prevented the injury would have
been less burdensome or costly than the probability and magnitude of the loss
evident in the circumstances facing the plaintiff.218 In assessing the burden of
212. Id. at 667.
213. Id. at 668.
214. Id. The hotel eventually settled with Rountree's estate for $1.3 million. Telephone
Interview with Kathleen McCabe, attorney for Guest Quarters Suite Hotels, Cassiday, Schade
& Gloor, Chicago (Jan. 26, 1999).
215. See Bazyler, supra note 42, at 747 (arguing for imposition of duty on possessor).
216. A trio of young men parking and walking into a grocery store just after dark when
the parking lot is busy and well lit and the store is in a small, rural town that has for years been
free of any serious crime probably presents as low a risk as the same conduct would were it to
happen at noon.
217. See RESTATmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291-93 (1965) (asserting that law views
reasonableness through risk-utility analysis).
218. Id.
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precaution, then, whether the plaintiff might have foregone the activity in
question - perhaps by "staying home" - is indeed a legitimate inquiry, as is
whether plaintiff might have taken any affirmative precautionary acts along
with the conduct in question. Also, factfinders may properly consider the
social utility of the conduct at issue in evaluating the burden of any precau-
tionary acts or omissions for which the plaintiff might be at fault.2" 9
The case law discussed above illustrates four kinds of precautions
factfinders have found plaintiffs at fault for not having taken: refraining from
futile resistance to crime; refraining from provocation; keeping doors properly
secured; and refraining from placing oneself in a dangerous location without
sufficient reason." In not offering futile resistance to crime, the plaintiff's
burden of precaution might merely be giving up property rather than risking
bodily harm. Additionally, in Tokhi, a jury found the plaintiff twenty percent
at fault for attempting to disarm a gunman who was pointing a gun at the
plaintiff." Apparently, the jury found the burden of not acting in self-defense
would have "cost" less than taking action that would almost certainly result
in the plaintiff being shot.'
Erichsen, a much easier case, resulted in a defense verdict.' Inthat case,
after a mugger had already maced and robbed Erichsen in a grocery store
parking lot, she pursued the mugger to his car and reached through the car
window in an attempt to retrieve her purse. 4 While recapturing one's chattels
has social utility, the burden to Erichsen of merely allowing the mugger to
escape with her purse is rather low. The potential loss for Erichsen consisted
primarily of suffering some loss of cash, perhaps, as well as the inconvenience
and expense of canceling credit cards and checks. Erichsen would also have
had costs from a decreased sense of security associated not only with the attack
itself, but also the mugger would know her identity and address. Although
these burdens are significant, the magnitude and probability of the harm facing
Erichsen as she reached inthroughthe car window was obviously much greater.
219. See PROSSER, supra note 37, § 65, at 418-19 (asserting that social utility of conduct
in question is appropriate consideration in evaluating actor's conduct).
220. See supra Part IILB (categorizing reported cases).
221. See Jones v. Tokhi, 535 N.W.2d 46,49 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming jury verdict
that plaintiff was twenty percent at fault for his own injuries for attempting to disarm gunman);
see also supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text (describing facts of case).
222. Because the plaintiff was in the company of three companions and the gunman's
associate was only urging the gunman to "shoot one of them," perhaps the jury saw the odds of
the plaintiff's being shot as only one in four at worst, whereas plaintiff's act of grabbing for the
gun virtually assured that the gunman would shoot him.
223. See Erichsen v. No-Frills Supermgarkets, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 116, 118 (Neb. 1994)
(describing plaintiff's injuries); see also supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text (describing
facts of case).
224. Erichsen, 518 N.W.2d at 118.
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Refraining from uttering words that provoke others who might respond
with violence is a low-cost precaution. The plaintiff in Gould might have
avoided injury merely by not responding when insulted.' Similarly, in
another case, plaintiff was exiting a bar in the evening when he saw a group
of men who had just left the same bar throwing rocks at a sign." Plaintiff,
in the company of his wife and some friends, apparently cursed the group of
men for their ill behavior, and the men then attacked him.' No doubt dis-
couraging vandals is appropriate conduct, but the social utility of his cursing
them, as compared with the alternative of ducking back inside the restaurant
to alert the management, seems quite low.
Factfinders have also determined plaintiffs to be at fault for failing to
keep a hotel or motel room door properly secured. Recall that ajury found the
plaintiff in Ledbetter thirty-five percent at fault for failing to lock the door-
knob after having engaged only the chain lock before going to sleep2 5
Another jury found a guest's reliance on an automatic door knob lock and
failure to lock a deadbolt to constitute fifty percent of fault in a rape at a
motel.2' The ease oflocking a door is obvious. Although courts likely would
not require guests to engage each lock on a room door at all times, the cost to
a guest of foregoing the conduct of going to sleep in her room without ensur-
ing that her door is properly locked is difficult to regard as high. Perhaps the
cost, in addition to a moment of time, is giving up not worrying about crime.
Finally, the reported cases also demonstrate factfinders' willingness to
lay blame on plaintiffs who place themselves in dangerous locations at dan-
gerous times." Such was the case in Hardee when the jury found the plain-
tiff sixty-eight percent at fault for washing his car at night at a self-service car
wash that Hardee knew or should have known had been the scene of previous
225. See Gould v. Taco Bell, 722 P.2d 511, 513-14 (Kan. 1986) (describing intentional
tortfeasor's insult of plaintiff as intentional tortfeasor was leaving restaurant and plaintiff's
response); see also supra notes 138-48 and accompanying text (describing facts of case).
226. See Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222,233 (N.J. 1991) (noting thatjury apportioned
thirty percent of fault to patron of restaurant who allegedly cursed group of other patrons
throwing rocks at sign in parking lot prior to group's attack on plaintiff but remanding for new
trial for apportionment of fault of intentional tortfeasors).
227. Id.
228. See Ledbetter v. Concord Gen. Corp., 665 So. 2d 1166,1167-68 (La. 1996) (noting
that jury found plaintiff thirty-five percent at fault for her own rape after plaintiff failed properly
to lock her motel room door).
229. See HotelLiable for Negligent Hiring of Carpet Installer Who Raped Guest, 10 NO.
1 VERDIcTs, SETILEMENTs & TACnCS 25 (describing case in which during early morning hours
assailant, who told police he pushed on door and it opened, cut, raped, and sodomized motel
guest who remembered shutting door that locked automatically but could not remember locking
deadbolt).
230. See supra notes 159-68 and accompanying text (describing case in which plaintiff was
stabbed at night at car wash).
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crime.3 The social utility of washing one's vehicle is not nil, but neither is
it substantial. Furthermore, Hardee need not have given up the activity
entirely but could have selected either a safer location or a safer time to wash
his car.
Thus, the case law 2 reveals a few general admonitions juries seem to
have sent plaintiffs regarding precautions expected of individuals to keep
themselves safe from crime. This case law also reaffrms the contextual
nature of determinations of negligence and contributory negligence. As a
result, discussions of burdens ofprecaution divorced from consideration of the
magnitude and probability of the loss have limited value in evaluating con-
duct. Therefore, this Note turns to one additional case, Zerangue v. Delta
Towers, Ltd., 3 to examine a plaintiff's comparative responsibility for her
injuries through an evaluation of all factors in the Hand Formula. 34
Plaintiff Susan Zerangue, a- young woman who had traveled to New
Orleans with family and friends for Mardi Gras, became separated from her
party and was denied access to her hotel, the Hilton, because she carried no
identification3 5 She then went to a Ramada with an acquaintance who was
staying there.' 6 Zerangue awoke at 3:00 a.m. and, concerned that her com-
panions were worried about her whereabouts, sought to returnto the Hilton. 7
Finding no one in the Ramada lobby to help her find a taxi, Zerangue exited
the hotel through a bank of glass doors, after initially finding several of the
doors to be locked.3 Finding no taxi outside but seeing she was alone on the
street except for a strange man walking toward her, Zerangue tried to reenter
231. See Hardee v. Cunningham & Smith, Inc., 679 So. 2d 1316,1318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (affirming jury verdict apportioning sixty-eight percent of fault to plaintiff whom
assailants stabbed, beat, and robbed at self-service car wash).
232. See supra Part IV.B (discussing cases in which juries have found plaintiffs at fault for
their own injuries).
233. 820 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1987).
234. Zerangue v. Delta Towers, Ltd., 820 F.2d 130, 131-32 (5th Cir. 1987) (describing
circumstances leading to attack). In Zerangue, the issue was whether a jury's finding that a
hotel breached a duty of care to the plaintiff, Zerangue, was supported by sufficient evidence.
Id. at 132. A rapist attacked Zerangue after she exited the hotel at 3:00 a.m. in search of a taxi.
Id. No employee had been in the lobby to assist Zerangue, and the doors to the hotel were
locked from the outside, preventing her reentry to escape attacker. Id. The court reasoned that
because the evidence showed a security guard was assigned to have been present in the lobby
from which Zerangue exited the hotel and that the guard testified he would have stopped
Zerangue from exiting the hotel, jury was justified in finding the hotel breached a duty of care
to Zerangue. Id at 133. Thus, the court affirmed the jury's apportionment of seventy percent
of the fault to the hotel and thirty percent of the fault to Zerangue. Id.
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the hotel, but all the doors were locked from the outside. 9 The man eventu-
ally produced a knife, dragged Zerangue across the street, and raped and
sodomized her. 40 The jury found Zerangue thirty percent at fault and the
Ramada seventy percent at fault for her injuries.241
Several precautions were available to Zerangue after she awoke with the
concern that her friends and family might be worried about her absence. She
could, of course, have merely telephoned the Hilton. If one of her party were
in their room, Zerangue could have sent word of her whereabouts and made
arrangements to rejoin her family and friends at the Hilton later that day. As
it apparently stood when she left her room at the Ramada, Zerangue.was not
even certain that she would be able to gain access to the Hilton upon her
planned arrival because she had earlier been denied entry for not having
identification.
Zerangue might also have chosen not to exit the hotel to look for a cab
on her own. The bank of doors through which she exited was made primarily
of glass. Although the facts of the case do not say, the possibility exists that
she might have been able to see that there were no cabs on the street - and that
the street was deserted - from inside the hotel. Furthermore, although
Zerangue looked without success in the lobby for someone to help her, she did
not apparently venture to a second area just beyond the lobby where a clerk
was staffing the registration desk.242 Thus, another minute or two spent
searching for help inside the hotel might likely have been the difference
between a safe cab ride to the Hilton and the nightmarish attack Zerangue
found waiting for her on the street.
Yet, although Zerangue had some low-cost precautions available to her,
just how should she have assessed the probability and magnitude of injury she
risked by exiting the hotel? The court found that Zerangue, who was not from
New Orleans, knew nothing alout the street to which she exited.24  If
Zerangue did not know the street to which she was exiting was dangerous, 2'
it seems the jury must have found her unreasonable act was merely in placing
herself on a strange street at 3:00 an. without sufficient reason. Such a con-
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 132.
242. Id. at 133. The hotel apparently had two connected lobbies. Id. The staffed registra-
tion desk, from which an attendant could not observe the lobby from which Zerangue exited the
hotel, was located in a second lobby that Zerangue did not enter in her search for assistance. Id.
243. Id.
244. The supervisor of the hotel's security guards, who testified that a guard had been
assigned to have been present in the first lobby at the time Zerangue exited the hotel, also
testified that had he seen Zerangue attempt to leave he would have stopped her "because that
would be a dangerous thing to do." Id.
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clusion appears to justify the jury's assignment of some fault to Zerangue.
However, finding Zerangue partially responsible for her own injuries because
she placed herself in a dangerous situation also leaves unanswered a question
about one's duty to protect oneself from crime.
b. A Duty Not to Become a Victim
In contemplating the source of Zerangue's fault, recall that Dean Prosser
saw as part ofthe common knowledge ofmost every adult an awareness of-the
propensities of people toward crime.24 However, Prosser also asserted that,
"under all ordinary and normal circumstances, in the absence of any reason to
expect the contrary, the actor may reasonably proceed upon the assumption
that others will obey the criminal law."246 Perhaps, for Zerangue, 3:00 a.m.
in a strange city was not "ordinary and normal circumstances," or perhaps the
hour and her lack of knowledge about the neighborhood surrounding the hotel
should have provided sufficient "reason to expect the contrary." But criminal
attacks, said Prosser, "are still so unlikely in any particular instance that the
burden of taking continual precautions against them exceeds the apparent
risk.1247 Yet Zerangue, and indeed the cases in which factfinders found
plaintiffs at fault for failing to keep a hotel, motel, or office door properly
secured, demonstrates something to the contrary: Even in many "ordinary and
normal circumstances," for an individual to proceed upon the assumption that
others will obey the criminal law is unreasonable.
It seems doubtful that most juries would find that a woman who regularly
leaves work from a shopping mall in a large city an hour after the mall closes
and walks to her car, parked in the distant and nearly deserted employee
section of the mall parking lot, may reasonably proceed upon the assumption
that others will obey the criminal law. Forgoing precautions against criminal
attack until something or someone provides "reason to the contrary" may be
far too late. Similarly, it is doubtful that a man who pulls off the interstate
after midnight to check into a motel may reasonably presume, as he pulls
around back to his room, that anyone he meets in the parking lot will obey the
criminal law. Doubtless many juries would find that he had a duty at least to
scan the parking lot for suspicious persons, and that this burden of precaution
245. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 290 (1965) (asserting that for purposes of
determining whether actor should recognize that his conduct involves risk, he is required to
know "the qualities and habits of human beings"); PROSSER, supra note 37, § 32, at 159
(asserting every adult will know "the normal habits of human beings, including their propensi-
ties toward negligence and crime" (emphasis added)).
246. PROSSER, supra note 37, § 33, at 173-74. Although Prosser wrote these lines to
describe a defendant's duty, they are just as easily applicable to the conduct of a plaintiff.
247. Id.
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would hardly "exceed the apparent risk" until he learns that the situation is no
longer normal and ordinary.
A duty to anticipate and to take precautions against criminal attack, it
seems, would run contrary to Prosser's assertion that because crime is so
unlikely in any particular instance "continual precautions" are too burdensome.
However, Zerangue needed no particular knowledge of danger on the street
outside her hotel to be at fault for failing to anticipate a criminal attack. Also,
for DiVincenzo245 and Hardee,249 apparently only a general knowledge of prior
crime on or around the premises, rather than knowledge of an impending
criminal assault, for example, was sufficient for juries to hold them partially
at fault for the attacks they suffered. Indeed, there is nothing to indicate that
the jury found Ledbetter even had knowledge of prior criminal acts on or
around her motel before they found her at fault for failing properly to lock the
door to her room." ° She simply failed to anticipate an attack and take a low-
cost precaution to avoid it. Case law, the traditional tort policy ofnot imposing
unreasonable risks on oneself, the policy of preventing injury, and common
sense all seem to dictate that Prosser's nearly thirty-year-old assertion no
longer holds true and that generally to proceed as if others will obey the crimi-
nal law is unreasonable: People have a duty to anticipate and avoid the crimi-
nal acts of third parties, a duty not to become a victim.
No case law seems to articulate a plaintiff's duty to anticipate and to take
precautions against the criminal acts of third parties. That courts should
impose such a duty now seems clear. As discussed above, 1 over the past
twenty-five years, most American jurisdictions have broadly adopted section
344 of the Restatement, which recognizes a business possessor's duty to use
reasonable care to anticipate criminal acts of third persons and to take precau-
tions against them. 2 It makes sense, then, that if the states are to dispense
with the common-law rule that one need not anticipate the criminal acts of
third persons as far as possessors are concerned, states should then impose a
248. See Green Cos. v. DiVincenzo, 432 So. 2d 86,87 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1983) (noting
that plaintiff was twenty-five percent at fault for his own injuries); see also supra notes 12-16
and accompanying text (recounting facts of case).
249. See Hardee v. Cunningham & Smith, Inc., 679 So. 2d 1316,1317 (Fla. Dist. Ct App.
1996) (affirming that plaintiff was responsible for majority of fault in case in which assailants
stabbed, beat, and robbed plaintiff at carwash); see also supra notes 159-68 and accompanying
text (recounting facts of case).
250. See Ledbetter v. Concord Gen. Corp., 665 So. 2d 1166, 1168 (La. 1996) (noting that
plaintiff was thirty-five percent at fault in case where she was raped at motel); see also supra
notes 149-58 and accompanying text (recounting facts of case).
251. See supra Part II (discussing tests of foreseeability of crime to possessors in different
jurisdictions).
252. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 344 cmt. f (1965) (discussing scope of
duty).
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parallel duty on plaintiffs, even under ordinary and normal circumstances, to
anticipate and take precautions against criminal assaults.
Further, it would also make sense for the test applied to plaintiffs to be
quite similar to the test applied to possessors. Incongruity in the amount of
notice 3 required to establish foreseeabiity would appear unjust. For exam-
ple, in a "totality ofthe circumstances" state, such as Kansas," where the test
of foreseeability for possessors is quite broad, to hold that plaintiffs have a
duty only when harm is imminent would be like having slip and fall jurispru-
dence in which possessors are liable even though plaintiffs elect to walk
through the store blindfolded.
One might ask whether the distinction between negligence and contribu-
tory negligence should make any difference to a court considering whether to
impose a duty on plaintifi to anticipate and take precautions against criminal
attack. After all, negligence is imposing unreasonable risk on others."5
Contributory negligence is imposing unreasonable risk on oneself. 6 A recent
commentator asserted that the question of what risks we should be able to
impose on ourselves is tangential to tort law and that we are free to impose
risks on ourselves that would be unreasonable to impose on others."' Indeed,
one can recognize a clear moral difference between imposing risks on others
and imposing risks on oneself. However, the argument that tort law should
accord individuals much greater freedom to impose risks on themselves than
they would be allowed to impose on others must have limits. In the end,
greater freedom to impose risks on oneself makes sense only until, when
suffering an injury within that greater bundle of risks, the plaintiff seeks to lay
blame at the feet of a defendant. Such a plaintiff would then be forcing a
defendant to bear the cost of the plaintiff's greater risk taking, imposing those
253. In the reviewed cases in which factfinders held plaintiffs at fault for failing to take the
precautions of refraining from futile resistance or refraining from provocation, the plaintiffi had
clear notice of danger. In those cases in which juries found plaintiffs at fault for failing to keep
a door secure or for placing themselves at a location they knew or should have known was
dangerous, notice of danger was less clear. These differences seem to mirror those in the differ-
ent tests applicable to possessors. See supra Part II (describing tests of foreseeability applicable
to possessors).
254. See Seibert v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc., 856 P.2d 1332, 1339 (Kan. 1993) (adopting
totality of circumstances test).
255. See PRossER, supra note 37, § 65, at 418 (explaining that negligence is creation of
unreasonable risks of harm to others).
256. See id. (asserting that contributory negligence is conduct that involves unreasonable
risk of harm to oneself).
257. See Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48
STAN. L. REv. 311,323, 369 (1996) (asserting "[tlort law is only tangentially about the risks we
should impose on ourselves" and that "we may rationally run some risks that would be unrea-
sonable for us to impose on others.. ").
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greater risks on others. Thus, at least as far as negligent security actions are
concerned, imposing a duty on plaintiffs that allows them no more freedom
to impose risk of injury to themselves without being at fault than they could
impose on others without fault is a fairer system."
2. Comparing Fault
Whether or not states explicitly impose on plaintiffs a duty to anticipate
and to take precautions against crime, a number of states have reported cases
in which courts find plaintiffs in negligent security actions at least partially at
fault. 9 No doctrinal or statutory barrier prohibits a possessor from arguing
that a plaintiff was contributorily negligent in a negligent security action.2"°
How, then, once a factfinder determines that both the possessor 261 and the
plaintiff262 are at fault, is the factfinder properly to apportion their relative
shares of responsibility?
Judge Posner wrote in Wassell that comparing the negligence of a plain-
tiff and of a defendant constituted a "formless, unguided inquiry, because
there is no methodology for comparing the causal contributions of the plain-
tiff's and of the defendant's negligence to the plaintiff's injury.t2 63 Several
258. If a state were explicitly to impose a duty on plaintiffs to anticipate and take precau-
tions against crime even in the absence of clear notice of danger, it is doubtful that the case law
dealing with keeping doors secure and not placing oneself in a dangerous location without good
reason would exhaust the possible requirements juries would impose on plaintiffs to meet that
duty. A forecast of common sense precautions that juries could require for an individual's own
safety might be seen in a recent pamphlet from the National Crime Prevention Council. See
NATIONALCRmEPREVENTONCOUNCIL, STREET SENSE: IT'S COMMONSENSE (1998) (offering
tips for keeping oneself safe on "the street"). The Council urges the public to "take a bite out
of crime" by, among other things, staying alert to one's surroundings when out in public, asking
for an escort to one's car when working late, avoiding isolated parking areas and underground
garages, and refraining from wearing shoes or clothing that restrict one's movements. Id.
Although each of the first three of these suggestions seems to have played a role in at least one
of the cases mentioned in this Note, in no cases did ajury find a plaintiff at fault for how he or
she was dressed.
259. See supra Part IV.B (describing cases in which plaintiff found at least partially at fault
in negligent security actions under laws of Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, New Jersey, and
Wisconsin).
260. See generally WOODS & DEERE, supra note 90, § 4 (describing existing rules of
comparative negligence and their impact on other legal doctrines).
261. See supra Part I (describing four tests of foreseeability of third party criminal acts
currently used in states).
262. See supra Part IV (describing cases in which factfinders have judged plaintiffs at fault
in negligent security actions and suggesting framework for conducting analysis of plaintiff's
fault).
263. Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting lack of uniform
mechanism for comparing fault).
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commentators have agreed with Posner that the process of comparing fault is
arbitrary." Disagreement, however, comes with such basic aspects of the
undertaking as whether the factflnders are to compare causation or culpability
of conduct. In Wassell, Judge Posner advocated comparing causation.26
Others, including Dean Prosser, have asserted that factfinders should assess
only the relative culpability of the parties' conduct." Furthermore, commen-
tators disagree over whether the application of the Hand Formula should
promote wealth maximization through utilitarian cost-benefit analysis or
should promote social contract aspirations of equal freedom and mutual
benefit.267 Thus, attempting a comprehensive theory of comparative negli-
gence writ large is beyond the scope of this Note.2"
Despite scholarly disagreement over what social goals properly provide
the intellectual moorings for determinations of negligence and what methods
properly guide comparisons of negligence, however, the Hand Formula's
interpretation of negligence is black letter law.269 Indeed, one recent commen-
tator remarked that he knew of no modem decision to reject the Hand For-
mula. 0 Furthermore, as noted above, the Hand Formula also is applicable to
264. See GLANMLLE L. WKLAMS, JOINT TORTS AND CONTRIBUTORYNEGIIGENCE § 44,
at 158 (photo. reprint 1998) (1951) (asserting that "in attempting to assess degrees of negligence
the judge is trying to measure the immeasurable. . we should recognize that the action is
arbitrary... "); Ray J. Aiken, Proportioning Comparative Negligence: Problems of Theory
and Special Verdict Formulation, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 293, 295 (1970) (arguing "no rational or
objective legal standard or definition is possible" (emphasis omitted)).
265. See Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849,854 (7th Cir. 1989) (containing Judge Posner's
observation that comparative negligence necessitates comparing causation).
266. See William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465,481 (1953)
(arguing that, after proof of actual and proximate cause established, factfinder should only
assess relative culpability of parties' conduct).
267. See generally Keating, supra note 257 (asserting social contract conception of due
care serves purposes of tort law better than does economic conception due care).
268. The Restatement of Torts: Apportionment ofLiability offers a comprehensive treat-
ment of comparative liability. As written at the time of this Note's publication, it instructs
factfinders assigning comparative percentages of responsibility to consider factors including:
"(a) factors necessary to determine whether a person is liable; (b) the character and nature of
each person's risk-creating behavior, (c) the causal connection between the risk-creating
conduct and the harm; and (d) each person's actual awareness, intent, or indifference with
respect to the risks created by the conduct." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: APPORTIONmENT OF
LIABILITY § 8 (Proposed Final Draft (Revised) (March 22, 1999)). Nonetheless, of course, "[i]t
is not possible to articulate an algorithm by which a factflnder can determine percentages of
responsibility." Id. at reporters' note cmt c.
269. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291-93 (1965) (analyzing reasonableness
through risk-utility analysis).
270. See Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015,1015-16
(1994) (remarking on widespread acceptance of Hand Formula).
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determinations of contributory fault." Factfinders, then, can apportion fault
between a plaintiff and a defendant by comparing the extent to which each
party deviated from the applicable standard of conduct. Thus, as a party is
at fault when the burden of precaution is less than the possible gravity of the
injury multiplied by the probability of its occurrence (B<PL), then the greater
the difference between the burden of precaution and the probability and
magnitude of the loss, the greater the party's fault. 3
Judge Posner conducted this type of comparison between the respective
costs of avoiding the injury in Wassel.27 4 Although Posner clearly disagreed
with the jury's apportionment of ninety-seven percent of the fault to
Marisconish, he calculated that the motel's cost of a security guard for one
year would have been twenty thousand dollars, and that twenty thousand
dollars was at least thirty-two times the "monetary equivalent" of greater
caution on Marisconish's part.2 5 Such a calculation, said Posner, represented
a sufficiently rational apportionment of fault that the trial judge's decision to
deny the plaintiffs motion notwithstanding the verdict was not an abuse of
discretion.2 6
Although the Hand Formula has clear utility for comparing a plaintiffs
and a defendant's fault, jury instructions rarely embody the Hand Formula.277
Instead of being told to balance the costs and benefits of greater care, juries
are apparently more often told to determine whether an actor behaved as
would a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances but are left
without a definition of how the law determines reasonableness.2 8 Therefore,
271. See Sobelsohn, supra note 183, at 420-21 (using Hand Formula to determine each
party's deviation from standard of care).
272. See id. at 419 (introducing proposed system for comparing fault).
273. Id. Sobelsohn also suggests a second calculation by the jury. Id. at 420. If a jury
determined that B was less than PL, the jury would then divide PL by B, producing a "fault
quotient" Id. Sobelsohn rejected as too likely to confuse the jury yet a third calculation:
having the jury then discount the fault quotient by the jury's assessment of either cause-in-fact
or proximate cause. Id Factfinders should compare the relative culpability of each party's
conduct, but even asking the jury to calculate separate values for B and for PL and then to
divide PL by B is probably too confusing.
274. See Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849, 854-56 (7th Cir. 1989) (describing comparison
of fault); see also supra notes 99-114 and accompanying text (describing facts of case). Al-
though Posner's opinion spoke of comparing causation, his comparison of the relative costs to
each party of avoiding the injury seems clearly to be a comparison of relative culpability.
Wassell, 865 F.2d at 856.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See Gilles, supra note 270, at 1015-17 (commenting on how infrequentlyjury instruc-
tions embody Hand Formula despite its widespread acceptance).
278. Id. at 1017-19.
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this Note offers for consideration the appended model jury instructions to
courts trying negligent security cases in which possessors assert comparative
fault as a defense.279
The appended model jury instructions seek to allow for the apportion-
ment ofthe responsibility for a criminal attack that takes place on the property
of one who has a duty to prevent such attacks to three actors: the intentional
tortfeasor, the possessor, and the plaintiff. As a threshold question for impos-
ing liability on any party, questions one through four ask the jury whether the
intentional tortfeasor battered the plaintiff." If the jury finds that an inten-
tional tort has been committed, it then is to assess the blameworthiness of the
intentional tortfeasor's conduct." 1 Next, the jury is to assess the fault of the
possessor, if any, by balancing the burdensomeness of additional security
precautions against the risks of not doing so that the possessor would reason-
ably have perceived under the circumstances. 2 The jury then assesses the
fault of the plaintiff, if any, again by balancing the burdensomeness of addi-
tional security precautions against the risk one would reasonably perceive
under the circumstances." 3 Having derived numerical values from one to ten
representing the fault of each party, the jury adds the numbers to find the
'"t otal fault' and divides each party's fault by this denominator to generate
each party's percentage of fault.24 Thus, juries would appropriately retain a
great deal of freedom in assigning fault. However, by using jury instructions
requiring assessment of negligent fault through the Hand Formula, courts
279. See infra Appendix (containing jury instruction). Because the balancing test utilized
by California and Tennessee most closely follows the Hand Formula's conception of negligence,
the jury instructions offered by this Note are written for such jurisdictions. Furthermore,
because an increasing number of states are allowing juries to compare the fault of the intentional
tortfeasor, and because such a comparison is proper, an instruction on the fault of the intentional
tortfeasor is also included.
280. See infra Appendix, questions 1-4 (asking jury whether intentional tortfeasor battered
plaintiff and, if so, to assess as blameworthy intentional tortfeasor's conduct). One could
construct similar instructions in the unlikely event that the intentional tort plaintiff complains
of is, say, assault.
281. Infra Appendix, questions 1-4. "
282. See infra Appendix, questions 5-12 (asking jury to assess fault of possessor).
283. See infra Appendix, questions 12-19 (asking jury to assess fault of plaintif).
284. See infra Appendix, questions 20-21 (asking jury to determine each party's percentage
of fault). Thus, in Zerangue, a jury might have judged the fault of the intentional tortfeasor to
be ten, the fault of the hotel to be six, and the fault of the Zerangue to be seven. See Zerangue
v. Delta Towers, Ltd., 820 F.2d 130, 131-132 (La. 1987) (describing facts of case in which
plaintiff was abducted and raped after exiting hotel in middle of night). The "total fault," then
was twenty-three. Thus, the jury would have apportioned to the intentional tortfeasor roughly
forty-four percent of the fault, the possessor twenty-six percent of the fault, and Zerangue thirty
percent of the fault
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could lead juries to evaluate the parties' conduct in a manner more consistent
with the law's understanding of reasonableness.
V Conclusion
Over the past twenty-five years, all states have imposed a duty on busi-
ness possessors to anticipate and to take precautions against foreseeable
criminal conduct that might injure their patrons. The states have not expressly
imposed on plaintiffs a parallel duty to anticipate and take precautions against
crime for their own safety. Although the doctrine of contributory negligence,
when it served as a complete defense to a plaintiff's recovery, provided
sufficient justification for not imposing such a duty on plaintiffs, the advent
of comparative fault both has removed the need to bar comparison of inten-
tional and negligent fault and has removed the justification for refraining from
imposing a duty on plaintiffs to avoid suffering an intentional tort. Now that
comparative fault systems can apportion to multiple parties the responsibility
for a single injury, states should continue to adopt policies allowing for
comparison of intentional and negligent fault. Furthermore, states should
impose on plaintiffs a duty reasonably to anticipate and to avoid suffering
intentional torts, a duty to avoid becoming a victim. Finally, the Hand For-
mula provides the proper framework for an analysis of the reasonableness of
precautions taken both by the possessor and by the plaintiff to anticipate and
avoid crime.
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Appendix
Verdict Form
Intentional Tortfeasor's Faule s
1. Every person owes a duty not to harm others intentionally.
2. Intentional Tortfeasor breached his duty not to harm Plaintiff inten-
tionally only if it is more likely than not that he: 1. acted, 2. with intent to
cause harmful or offensive bodily contact; 3. there was bodily contact, and
4. the contact resulted in harm or offense.
3. If Intentional Tortfeasor breached his duty not to harm Plaintiff inten-
tionally, he is at least partially at fault for her injuries. Did Intentional Tort-
feasor breach his duty not to harm Plaintiff intentionally?
Yes No
If no, then neither Intentional Tortfeasor nor Possessor is at fault. Please
sign the verdict form and notify my clerk that you have reached a verdict.
If yes, proceed to question 4.
4. On a scale of one to ten, with ten being the greatest, circle how blame-
worthy was Intentional Tortfeasor's conduct in causing Plaintiff's injuries.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Go to question 5.
Possessor's Fault
5. Possessors of business property are not insurers of their patrons'
safety. However, business possessors owe a duty to use reasonable care to
anticipate and take precautions against criminal conduct by third parties which
is likely to endanger the safety of their patrons.
6. The amount of caution required ofa business possessor in the exercise
of reasonable care depends upon balancing the costs of taking security precau-
285. The terms "intentional tortfeasor," "possessor," and "plaintiff" are capitalized in these
instructions to indicate where parties' names would be substituted.
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tions against the magnitude of the risk of harmful criminal conduct apparent
to the business owner, or the magnitude of the risk that should have been
apparent to a reasonably prudent business owner under the same or similar
circumstances.
7. Therefore, Possessor breached its duty of care only if it failed to take
the additional precautions a reasonably prudent business possessor would
have taken under the same or similar circumstances. The circumstances you
may consider in your evaluation of Possessor's conduct include, but are not
limited to, the burdens and likely effectiveness of additional security precau-
tions; the type and character of the business and the character of the surround-
ing neighborhood; and any previous crime on the premises of which Possessor
knew or should have known.
8. Did Possessor breach the duty of care it owed to its patrons?
Yes No
If no, Possessor is not at fault for Plaintiffs injuries. Please proceed to
question 13.
If yes, proceed to question 9.
9. Is it more likely than not that Plaintiff would not have been injured if
Possessor would have taken the additional precaution(s).
Yes No____
If no, Possessor is not at fault for Plaintiff's injuries. Please proceed to
question 13.
If yes, proceed to question 10.
10. Is it more likely than not that the injuries suffered by Plaintiff are the
kind that are reasonably expected by Possessor's failure to take additional
precautions?
Yes No
If no, Possessor is not at fault for Plaintiff's injuries. Please proceed to
question 12.
If yes, proceed to question 11.
11. On a scale of one to ten, how much did the risks of not taking the
additional precautions outweigh the costs of taking the precautions Possessor
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should have taken. Circling "1" means the risks only slightly outweighed the
costs, and circling " 10" means the risks greatly outweighed the costs.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Proceed to question 12.
Plaintiff's Fault
12. Individuals owe to themselves a duty to use reasonable care to antici-
pate and take precautions against criminal conduct by third parties.
13. The amount of care required by a person in the exercise of reasonable
care depends upon balancing the burdens of taking precautions against the
magnitude of the risk apparent to the individual, or the magnitude of the risk
that should have been apparent to a reasonably prudent person under the same
or similar circumstances.
14. Therefore, Plaintiff breached the duty of care she owed herself only
if she failed to take precautions a reasonably prudent person would have taken
under the same or similar circumstances. The circumstances you may con-
sider in your evaluation of Plaintiff's conduct include, but are not limited to,
the burdens and likely effectiveness of additional precautions; the type, char-
acter, and location of the business and her purpose for being on the premises;
the character of the surrounding neighborhood; and any previous crime on the
premises of which Plaintiff knew or should have known.
15. Did Plaintiff breach the duty of care she owed to herself?
Yeso__ No
If no, plaintiff is not partially at fault for her own injuries. Proceed to
question 19.
If yes, proceed to question 16.
16. Is it more likely than not that Plaintiff would not have been injured if
she had taken the additional precautions?
Yes No
If no, plaintiff is not partially at fault for her own injuries. Proceed to
question 19.
If yes, proceed to question 17.
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17. Is it more likely than not that the injuries suffered by Plaintiff are the
kind that are reasonably expected by her failure to take the additional precau-
tions?
Yes No
If no, the plaintiff is not partially at fault for her own injuries. Proceed
to question 19.
If yes, proceed to question 18.
18. On a scale of one to ten, how much did the risks of not taking the
additional precautions outweigh the costs of taking the precautions Plaintiff
should have taken. Circling "1" means the risks only slightly outweighed the
costs, and circling "10" means the risks greatly out weighed the costs.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Proceed to question 19.
Apportioning Fault
19. Indicate below the number representing the fault you have found in





20. Divide each party's fault by the total fault above to determine each
party's percentage of fault.
Intentional Tortfeasor %
Possessor %
Plaintiff %
Total 100 %

SYMPOSIUM

